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Abstract
We develop a dynamic network formation model that can explain the observed nested-
ness in real-world networks. Links are formed on the basis of agents’ centrality and have
an exponentially distributed life time. We use stochastic stability to identify the net-
works to which the network formation process converges and find that they are nested
split graphs. We completely determine the topological properties of the stochastically
stable networks and show that they match features exhibited by real-world networks.
Using four different network datasets, we empirically test our model and show that it
fits well the observed networks.
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1. Introduction
Nestedness is an important aspect of real-world networks.1 For example, the orga-
nization of the New York garment industry [Uzzi, 1996] and of the Fedwire bank net-
work [Soramaki et al., 2007] are nested in the sense that their organization is strongly
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1A network exhibits nestedness if the neighborhood of a node is contained in the neighborhoods of the
nodes with higher degrees.
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hierarchical. If we consider, for example, the Fedwire network, it is characterized by a
relatively small number of strong flows (many transfers) between banks with the vast
majority of linkages being weak to non-existing (few to no interbank payment flows).
Furthermore, the topology of this network is highly dissortative since large banks are
disproportionately connected to small banks, and vice versa; the average bank was con-
nected to 15 others. In other words, most banks have only a few connections while a
small number of “hubs” have thousands. A˚kerman and Larsson [2010], who study the
evolution of the global arms trade network using a unique dataset on all international
transfers of major conventional weapons over the period 1950-2007, also find that these
networks are nested and dissortative in the sense that big countries mainly trade arms
with small countries but small countries do not trade with each other. Using aggregate
bilateral imports from 1950 to 2000, De Benedictis and Tajoli [2011] analyze the struc-
ture of the world trade network over time, detecting and interpreting patterns of trade
ties among countries. Figure 3 in their paper shows a clear core-periphery structure, indi-
cating nestedness of their networks. Interestingly, in all these networks, dissortativity
arises naturally since “big” agents tend to interact with “small” agents and vice versa.
For example, banks seek relationships with each other that are mutually beneficial. As a
result, small banks interact with large banks for security, lower liquidity risk and lower
servicing costs, and large banks may interact with small banks in part because they can
extract a higher premium for services and can accommodate more risk.
Surprisingly, nestedness has not been studied from a theoretical point of view, even
though other salient features of networks such as “small world” properties with high
clustering and short average path lengths [Watts and Strogatz, 1998] as well as “scale-
free” or power-law degree distributions [Barabasi and Albert, 1999] have received a lot
of attention.2
The first aim of this paper is to propose a dynamic network formation model that
exhibits not only the standard features of real-world networks (small worlds, high clus-
tering, short path lengths and a power-law degree distributions) but also nestedness and
dissortativity. The second aim is to provide a microfoundation for the network forma-
tion process where linking decisions are based on the utility maximization of each agent
rather than on a random process, which is often assumed in most dynamic models of
network formation. The last aim of this paper is to provide some evidence that our
model matches well some real-world network features (interbank loans, trade in con-
ventional goods and arms trade between countries), especially their nestedness.
To be more precise, we develop a dynamic model where, at each period of time,
agents play a two-stage game: in the first stage, as in Ballester et al. [2006], agents play
2See Jackson and Rogers [2007] who propose a model that has all these features but not nestedness.
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their equilibrium contributions proportional to their Bonacich centrality3 while, in the
second stage, a randomly chosen agent can update her linking strategy by creating a
new link as a best response to the current network. Links do not last forever but have
an exponentially distributed life time. The most valuable links (i.e. the ones with the
highest Bonacich centrality) decay at a lower rate than those that are less valuable. As a
result, the formation of social networks can be regarded as a tension between the search
for new linking opportunities and volatility that leads to the decay of existing links.
We introduce noise into the decision process to form links [see, e.g. Sandholm, 2010],
and analyze the limit of the invariant distribution, the stochastically stable networks, as
the noise vanishes to zero.4 We first show that, in this limit, starting from arbitrary ini-
tial conditions, at each period of time the network generated by this dynamic process is
a nested split graph. These graphs, which are relatively well-known in the applied math-
ematics literature [Cvetkovic and Rowlinson, 1990; Mahadev and Peled, 1995], have a
very nice and simple structure that make them very tractable. To the best of our knowl-
edge, this is the first time that a complex dynamic network formation model can be
characterized by such a simple structure in terms of networks it generates. By doing
so, we are able to bridge the economics literature and the applied mathematics/physics
literatures in a simple way. Because of their simple features, we then show that degree,
closeness, eigenvector and Bonacich centrality induce the same ordering of nodes in
a nested split graph (this is also true for betweenness centrality if the ordering is not
strict). This implies, in particular, that if we had a game where agents formed links ac-
cording to other measures of centrality (such as degree, closeness, or betweenness) than
the Bonacich centrality, then all our results would be unchanged. We then show that the
stochastically stable network is a nested split graph. Instead of relying on a mean-field
approximation of the degree distribution as most dynamic network formation models
do, because of the nature of nested split graphs, we are able to derive explicit solu-
tions for all network statistics of the stochastically stable networks (by computing the
3Centrality is a fundamental measure of the importance of actors in social networks. See
Wasserman and Faust [1994] for an introduction and survey. The Bonacich centrality, introduced by
Bonacich [1987] of a particular node counts the total number of paths that start from this node in the
graph, weighted by a decay factor based on path length.
4In the literature on coordination games (see e.g. Kandori et al. [1993]), the noise is introduced as
an equilibrium selection device, when, in the absence of noise, multiple equilibria can emerge. This is
not the case here since we have a unique steady-state equilibrium even when the noise tends to zero.
Introducing some noise allows us to better calibrate our model to the data since, when the noise goes to
zero, the diameter of the steady-state network is equal to two, a feature that is not always observed in
the data. In other words, the noise allows us to have some flexibility with the model so that it can be
calibrated to empirically observed networks. This is what is done in Figure 11, where we show that our
model matches well various features of four real-world networks. Also, in Table 1, our estimates of the
model’s parameters indicate that the level of noise does not vanish.
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adjacency matrix).5 We also find that, by altering the rate at which linking opportuni-
ties arrive and links decay, a sharp transition takes place in the network density. This
transition entails a crossover from highly centralized networks when the linking oppor-
tunities are rare and the link decay is high to highly decentralized networks when many
linking opportunities arrive and only few links are removed.
The intuition of these results is as follows. Agents want to link to other agents who
are more central since this leads to higher efforts (as efforts are proportional to central-
ity) and higher efforts raise payoffs. Similarly, links to agents with lower centrality last
shorter. Notice moreover that, once someone loses a link with an agent, she becomes
less central and this makes it more likely that the next link she has will also disappear.
Thus link gains and losses are self reinforcing. This intuition suggests that if α, the prob-
ability of adding links, is large then the process should approximate a complete network
while if it is small then the process should approximate the star network. The key in-
sight of our model is that, for intermediate values of α, the stochastically stable network is a
nested split graph.
We then proceed by showing that our model reproduces some empirical observa-
tions of real-world networks. We show that the stochastically stable networks emerging
in our link formation process are characterized by short path length with high clustering,
exponential degree distributions with power-law tails, negative degree-clustering correlation
and nestedness. These networks also show a clear core-periphery structure. Moreover,
we show that stochastically stable networks are dissortative.
Using four different data sources, we empirically test our model. We analyze the net-
work of Austrian banks, the global banking network, the trade network (import-export
relationships between countries) and the network of arms trade between countries. De-
spite the fact that these networks are very different, they all exhibit strong nestedness
and dissortativity, and we find a reasonable goodness of fit of our model with these
networks (even though it is only parsimoniously parameterized).
Our paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discussed the relation of our model
to the literature. In Section 3, we introduce the model and discuss the basic properties
of the network formation process. Next, Section 4 shows that stochastically stable net-
works exist, can be computed analytically and are nested-split graphs. After deriving
the stochastically stable networks in Section 5, we analyze their properties in terms of
topology and centralization. Using four different network datasets, we empirically test
our model in Section 6. All proofs can be found in Appendix A. There are also dif-
ferent supplementary appendices. Appendix B gives all the necessary definitions and
5In a nested split graph the degree distribution uniquely defines the adjacency matrix (up to a permu-
tation of the node labels).
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characterizations of networks used throughout the paper. In Appendix C, we provide
some general results for nested split graphs in terms of their topology properties and
centralization measures. For the purpose of motivating the empirical test of our model
with the four datasets mentioned above, we provide an interpretation of our theoretical
model in terms of networks of banks and trade networks in Appendix D. Moreover, we
extend our analysis in Appendix E by including linking costs.
2. Relation to the Literature
The literature on network formation is basically divided in two strands that are not
communicating very much with each other. In the random network approach (mainly
developed by mathematicians and physicists), which is mainly dynamic, the reason
why a link is formed is pure chance. In this approach, researchers study how emerg-
ing networks match real-world networks [see e.g. Vega-Redondo, 2007]. While sharing
some common features with this literature, our model is quite different since agents do
not create links randomly but in a strategic way, i.e. theymaximize their utility function.
In the other approach (developed by economists; see, in particular, [Jackson and Wolinsky,
1996]), the reason for the formation of a link is strategic interactions. Individuals care-
fully decide with whom to interact and this decision entails some consent by both parts
in a given relationship. There are some dynamic network formation models with strate-
gic interactions. Bala and Goyal [2000], Watts [2001], Watts [2001], Jackson and Watts
[2002], Dutta et al. [2005] are prominent papers of this literature. Our model is different
than the ones developed in these papers in the sense that we consider both dynamic
models of network formation and optimal actions from agents. This allows us to give
a microfoundation of the network formation process as equilibrium actions transform
into equilibrium utility functions. Another crucial difference is that we are able to match
most features of real-world networks while these models do not.6
There is also another strand of the literature (called “games on networks”) that takes
the network as given and studies how the network structure impacts on outcomes and
individual decisions.7 A prominent paper of this literature is Ballester et al. [2006].8
6Mele [2010] and Liu et al. [2012] provide interesting dynamic network formation models where in-
dividuals decide with whom to form links by maximizing a utility function. However, contrary to our
model, these papers do not characterize analytically the degree distribution and the resulting network
statistics.
7See Jackson and Zenou [2014], for a recent overview of this literature.
8Bramoulle´ and Kranton [2007], Bramoulle´ et al. [2011] and Galeotti et al. [2010] are also important
papers in this literature. The first paper focuses on strategic substitutabilities while the second one pro-
vides a general framework solving any game on networks with perfect information and linear best-reply
functions. The last paper investigates the case when agents do not have perfect information about the
network. Because of its tractability, in the present paper, we use the model of Ballester et al. [2006] who
analyze a network game of local complementarities under perfect information.
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They mainly show that if agents’ payoffs are linear-quadratic, then the unique interior
Nash equilibrium of an n−player game in which agents are embedded in a network is
such that each individual effort and outcome is proportional to her Bonacich centrality
measure. In the present paper, we introduce strategic interactions in a non-random dy-
namic network formation game where agents also choose how much effort they put in
their activities.
There are some papers that, as in our framework, combine both network formation
and endogenous efforts. These papers include Bramoulle´ et al. [2004], Cabrales et al.
[2011], Calvo-Armengol and Zenou [2004], Galeotti and Goyal [2010], Goyal and Vega-Redondo
[2005], Goyal and Joshi [2003], Jackson and Watts [2002]. Most of these models are,
however, static and the network formation process is different.
Our paper is also related to Jackson and Rogers [2007], who also motivate their mod-
eling approach by means of statistics of empirical networks.
Finally, the paper by Ko¨nig and Tessone [2011] shows that our model can be applied
not only to an economic context, but also to a variety of models studied in the physics
literature, ranging from the analysis of ecological systems to physical synchronization
processes being coupled to network dynamics. They extend our model by introducing
heterogeneous selection probabilities of the nodes depending on the number of links
they already have, derive the dynamics of the degree distribution in the continuous limit
and analyze its properties. They show that the stationary degree distribution is given
by a double-power law with a flexible exponent. It has to be clear, however, that the
paper by Ko¨nig and Tessone [2011] is just an extension of our framework that analyzes
the nature of the phase transition from sparse to dense networks in the continuous limit.
It has been written after our paper9 and our main result that characterizes the steady-
state networks as nested split graphs is only proved in the current paper and then used
by Ko¨nig and Tessone [2011].
To summarize, our main contribution to the literature is that we are able to ex-
plain the emergence of nestedness in networks by analyzing a dynamic network for-
mation model with endogenous actions. We are also able to analytically characterize
the stochastically stable networks, which can be shown to be nested-split graphs, and to
provide a microfoundation for the link formation process. Even if nested-split graphs
have a much more regular structure than the complex networks we observe in many
real-world applications, they are easy to study, they are the result of endogenous ratio-
nal actions and they have most of the properties of real-world networks. Finally, we test
empirically our model with four different datasets and show that our model fits well
these observed networks.
9See our working paper Ko¨nig et al. [2009].
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3. The Model
In this section, we introduce the network formation process, which can be viewed as
a two-stage game on two separate time scales. On the fast time scale, all agents simul-
taneously choose their effort level in a fixed network structure. It is a game following
Ballester et al. [2006] with local complementarities where players have linear-quadratic
payoff functions. On the slow time scale, agents receive linking opportunities at a given
rate and decide with whom they want to form a link while the links they have cre-
ated decay after having reached their finite life time. This introduces two different time
scales, one in which agents are choosing their efforts in a simultaneous move game and
the second in which an agent forms a link and anticipates the equilibrium outcome in
the following simultaneous move game.
3.1. Nash Equilibrium and Bonacich Centrality
Consider a static network G in which the nodes represent a set N = {1, 2, . . . , n}
of agents/players. Following Ballester et al. [2006], each agent i ∈ N in the network
G selects an effort level xi ≥ 0, x ∈ R
n
+. Denote by Ω the countable state space of all
networks with n nodes. Then, each agent i receives a payoff πi : R
n
+ ×Ω×R+ → R of
the following form
πi(x,G, λ) = xi −
1
2
x2i + λ
n
∑
j=1
aijxixj, (1)
where λ ≥ 0 and aij ∈ {0, 1}, i, j = 1, . . . , n are the elements of the symmetric n × n
adjacency matrix A of G. This utility function is additively separable in the idiosyncratic
effort component (xi − 1/2x
2
i ) and the peer effect contribution (λ∑
n
j=1 aijxixj). Payoffs
display strategic complementarities in effort levels, i.e., ∂2πi(x,G, λ)/∂xi∂xj = λaij ≥ 0.
The general payoff structure in Equation (1) has a variety of applications. For exam-
ple, Equation (1) can be interpreted as the profit function of a bank competing in quan-
tities of lending a` la Cournot with other banks in a loan market where different types of
loans cannot be substituted. Equation (1) can also be interpreted as the payoff function
of a firm in country i acting as a local monopolist supplying a non-substitutable good.
In both cases interdependencies induce a reduction in marginal costs of production due
to technology spillovers and learning by doing effects. The supplementary Appendix D
provides a more detailed explanation of these two examples.
In order to find the Nash equilibrium solution associated with the above payoff func-
tion (1), we define a network centrality measure introduced by Bonacich [1987]. Let
λPF(G) be the largest real eigenvalue of the adjacency matrix A of network G. The adja-
cency matrix is a matrix that lists the direct connections in the network. If I denotes the
(n × n)-identity matrix and u ≡ (1, . . . , 1)⊤ the n-dimensional vector of ones then we
can define Bonacich centrality as follows:
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Definition 1. If and only if λ < 1/λPF(G) then the matrix B(G, λ) ≡ (I− λA)
−1 =
∑
∞
k=0 λ
kAk exists, is non-negative, and the vector of Bonacich centralities is defined as
b(G, λ) ≡ B(G, λ) · u. (2)
We can write the vector of Bonacich centralities as b(G, λ) = ∑∞k=0 λ
kAk · u = (I −
λA)−1 · u. For the components bi(G, λ), i = 1, . . . , n, we get
bi(G, λ) =
∞
∑
k=0
λk(Ak · u)i =
∞
∑
k=0
λk
n
∑
j=1
(
Ak
)
ij
, (3)
where
(
Ak
)
ij
is the ij-th entry of Ak.
Now we can turn to the equilibrium analysis of the game.
Theorem 1 (Ballester et al. [2006]). Consider the n–player simultaneous move game with pay-
offs given by Equation (1) and strategy space Rn+. If λ < 1/λPF(G), there exists a unique
interior Nash equilibrium, which, for each agent i = 1, . . . , n, is given by
x∗i = bi(G, λ). (4)
Moreover, the equilibrium payoff of each agent i is given by
π∗i (G, λ) = πi(x
∗,G, λ) =
1
2
(x∗i )
2 =
1
2
b2i (G, λ). (5)
Observe that the condition λ < 1/λPF(G) is an endogenous object. Below, we will
consider a dynamic network formation model where this condition has to hold at each
period of time.10
Furthermore, Ballester et al. [2006] have shown that the equilibrium outcome and
the payoff for each player increases with the number of links in G (because the number
of network walks increases in this way). This implies that, if an agent is given the
opportunity to change her links, she will add as many links as possible. On the other
hand, if she is only allowed to form one link at a time, she will form the link to the
agent that increases her payoff the most. In both cases, eventually, the network will
then become complete, i.e. each agent is connected to every other agent. However, to
avoid this latter unrealistic situation, we assume that the agents are living in a volatile
environment that causes links to decay such that the complete network can never be
10In order for this condition not to depend on an endogenous variable (i.e. λPF(G) varies with the
evolution of the network), we can use the sufficient condition λ < 1/
√
2m(n− 1)/nwherem is an upper
bound on the number of links in G. See Cvetkovic and Rowlinson [1990] for various other bounds on the
largest eigenvalue λPF(G).
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reached. Instead the architecture of the network adapts to the volatile environment. We
will treat these issues more formally in the next section.
3.2. The Network Formation Process
Wenow introduce a network formation process that incorporates the idea that agents
with high Bonacich centrality (their equilibrium effort levels) are more likely to connect
to each other, while the links they have established between each other have a longer
life time if they are viewed as more valuable to them.
We consider a continuous time Markov chain (G(t))t∈R+ with G(t) = (N , E(t))
comprising the set of agentsN = {1, . . . , n} together with the set of edges/links E(t) ⊂
N × N at time t between them. (G(t))t∈R+ is a collection of random variables G(t),
indexed by time t ∈ R+ on a probability space (Ω,F ,P), where Ω is the countable state
space of all networks with n nodes, F is the σ-algebra σ ({G(t) : t ∈ R+}) generated by
the collection of G(t), and P : F → [0, 1] is a countably additive, non-negative measure
on (Ω,F ) with total mass ∑G∈Ω P(G) = 1. At every time t ≥ 0, links can be created or
decay with specified rates that depend on the current network G(t) ∈ Ω.
Definition 2. Consider a continuous time Markov chain (G(t))t∈R+ on the probability space
(Ω,F ,P). Let ß∗(G(t), λ) ≡ (π∗1(G(t)), . . . ,π
∗
n(G(t))) denote the vector of Nash equilib-
rium payoffs of the agents in G(t) derived from the payoff function (1) with parameter 0 ≤ λ <
1/λPF(G(t)).
(i) At rate αi ∈ (0, 1), link creation opportunities arrive to each agent i ∈ N . If such an
opportunity arrives, then agent i computes the marginal payoff π∗i (G(t) ⊕ (i, j), λ) for each
agent j /∈ N\(Ni ∪ {i}) she is not already connected to, where this computation includes an
additive, exogenous stochastic term εij, incorporating possible mistakes in the computation of
the agent. We assume that the exogenous random terms εij are identically and independently
type I extreme value distributed (or Gumbel distributed) with scaling parameter ζ.11 Given that
agent i ∈ N receives a link creation opportunity, she then links to agent j ∈ N\(Ni ∪ {i})
with probability
b
ζ
i (j|G(t)) ≡ P
(
π∗i (G(t)⊕ (i, j), λ) + εij = max
k∈N\(Ni∪{i})
π∗i (G(t) ⊕ (i, k), λ) + εik
)
=
eπ
∗
i (G(t)⊕(i,j),λ)/ζ
∑k∈N\(Ni∪{i}) e
π∗i (G(t)⊕(i,k),λ)/ζ
.
It follows that the probability that during a small time interval [t, t+∆t) a transition takes place
11For the distribution of the error term it holds that P(ε ij ≤ c) = e
−ec/ζ−γ, where γ ≈ 0.58 is Euler’s
constant. The expectation is E(ε ij) = 0 and the variance is given by Var(ε ij) =
π2ζ2
6 .
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from G(t) to G(t)⊕ (i, j) is given byP(G(t+∆t) = G⊕ (i, j)|G(t) = G) = αib
ζ
i (j|G(t))∆t+
o(∆t).12
(ii) We assume that a link (i, j), once established, has an exponentially distributed life time
τij ∈ R+ with parameter ν
ζ
ij(G(t)) ≡
1
E(τij|G(t))
= βi fij(G(t)), including an agent specific
component βi ∈ (0, 1), and a link specific component
f
ζ
ij(G(t)) ≡
eπ
∗
i (G(t)⊖(i,j),λ)/ζ
∑k∈Ni e
π∗i (G(t)⊖(i,k),λ)/ζ
,
for any i ∈ N and j ∈ Ni. The probability that, during a small time interval [t, t + ∆t), a
transition takes place from G(t) to G(t)⊖ (i, j) is given by P(G(t+ ∆t) = G⊖ (i, j)|G(t) =
G) = βi f
ζ
ij(G(t))∆t + o(∆t).
Transitions to networks that differ by more than one link have probability of the order o(∆t).
In words, if agent i is chosen to form a link (at rate αi), she will choose the agent
that increases the most her utility. There is, however, a possibility of error, captured
by the stochastic term in the profit function. Furthermore, it is assumed that links do
not last forever but have an exponentially distributed life time with an expectation that
depends on the relative payoff loss from removing that link. The specific functional
form of the pairwise component f
ζ
ij(·) in the expected life time of a link incorporates
the fact that links which are more valuable to an agent (i.e. the ones with the highest
Bonacich centrality) live longer than the ones which are viewed as less valuable to her.
The value of a link is measured by the perceived loss in payoff incurred by the agent
from removing the link.13,14
It should be clear that, when a new link may be added to the network, then that link
proposal will always be accepted by the receiver. This is because it always increases the
utility of the receiver due to local complementarities in the utility function. In fact, we
12 f (t) = o(g(t)) as t→ ∞ if limt→∞ f (t)/g(t) = 0.
13In a similar way, Staudigl [2011] assumes that the linking activity levels of agents depend on their
relative marginal payoffs. Snijders [2001]; Snijders et al. [2010] introduce exponential link update rates,
which “depend on actor-specific covariates or on network statistics expressing the degree to which the
actor is satisfied with the present network structure.” See also Eq. (3.4) in Staudigl [2011] and Section 7.1
in Snijders [2001].
14The fact that links do not last forever is a quite natural feature of real-world networks. For example,
in the context of inter-firm alliances, Hagedoorn [2002] for research partnerships, Kogut et al. [2007] for
joint ventures, Harrigan [1988] for alliances and Park and Russo [1996] for (equity-based) joint ventures
provide empirical evidence on this phenomenon. For example, Harrigan [1988] studies 895 alliances from
1924 to 1985 and concludes that the average life-span of the alliance is relatively short, 3.5 years, with a
standard deviation of 5.8 years and 85 % of these alliances last less than 10 years. Park and Russo [1996]
focus on 204 joint ventures among firms in the electronic industry for the period 1979-1988. They show
that less than half of these firms remain active beyond a period of five years and for those that last less
than 10 years (2/3 of the total), the average lifetime turns out to be 3.9 years.
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will show below, that it will also be the best reply for the receiver (i.e. the best alternative
in terms of link formation).
Observe that when agents decide to create a link, they do it in a myopic way, that is
they only look at the agents that give them the current highest payoff. There is literature
on farsighted networks where agents calculate their lifetime-expected utility when they
want to create a link. We adopt here a myopic approach because of its tractability and
because our model also incorporates effort decision.15
We now discuss the networks generated by our model for large times t, and how
these depend on the error term parameterized by ζ. For this purpose, observe that the
Markov chain (G(t))t∈R+ can be described infinitesimally in time by the generator matrix
Qζ with elements given by the transition rates qζ : Ω×Ω → R defined by P(G(t+∆t) =
G′|G(t) = G) = qζ(G,G′)∆t + o(∆t) for G 6= G′ and P(G(t + ∆t) = G|G(t) = G) =
1+ qζ(G,G)∆t+ o(∆t) in the limit of ∆t ↓ 0. Consequently, qζ(G,G⊕ (i, j)) = αib
ζ
i (j|G)
and qζ(G,G⊖ (i, j)) = βi f
ζ
ij(G). The transition rates have the property that q
ζ(G,G′) =
qζ(G,G ± (i, j)) ≥ 0 if G′ differs from G by the link (i, j) and qζ(G,G′) = 0 if G′ differs
from G bymore than one link. Moreover, it must hold that ∑G′∈Ω q
ζ(G,G′) = 0, and one
can show that P(G(t) = G′|G(0) = G) = eQ
ζ t. If a non-negative solution to µζQζ = 0
with ∑G∈Ω µ
ζ(G) = 1 exists, then µζ is the stationary distribution of the Markov chain
satisfying µζ(G′) = limt→∞ P(G(t) = G′|G(0) = G) [see e.g. Liggett, 2010].
The most simple case is the one where ζ diverges, the error term εij becomes domi-
nant and the link formation and decay rates are payoff independent. The link creation
and decay rates for any i ∈ N are then given by
λi ≡ lim
ζ→∞
qζ(G,G⊕ (i, j)) = αi
1
|N \(Ni ∪ {i})|
, j ∈ N\(Ni ∪ {i}),
µi ≡ lim
ζ→∞
qζ(G,G⊖ (i, j)) = βi
1
|Ni|
, j ∈ Ni.
These transition rates correspond to a birth-death Markov chain with birth rates λi and
death rates µi [see e.g. Liggett, 2010, Chap. 2.7.1], and the stationary degree distribution
is the one of the corresponding birth-death chain. In the special case of αi = βi = 1/2
for all i ∈ N we obtain a Poisson degree distribution corresponding to a random graph
G(n, p) with an independent link probability p = 1/2.
A more interesting case, from a behavioral and topological point of view, is the
one where ζ converges to zero and the error term εij vanishes. For each agent i ∈
N let the best response be the set-valued map Bi : Ω → N defined as Bi(G) ≡
15Jackson and Watts [2002] argue that this form of myopic behavior makes sense if players discount
heavily the future.
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argmaxk∈N\(Ni∪{i})π
∗
i (G ⊕ (i, k), λ), and similarly we define the map Mi : Ω → N
asMi(G) ≡ argmaxk∈Niπ
∗
i (G⊖ (i, k), λ). In the limit ζ → 0, we then have that the link
creation and decay rates for any i ∈ N are given by
q(G,G⊕ (i, j)) ≡ lim
ζ→0
qζ(G,G⊕ (i, j)) = αi
1
|Bi(G)|
, j ∈ Bi(G),
q(G,G⊖ (i, j)) ≡ lim
ζ→0
qζ(G,G⊖ (i, j)) = βi
1
|Mi(G)|
, j ∈ Mi(G). (6)
We call a network G ∈ Ω stochastically stable if µ(G) > 0 where µ ≡ µ0 is the stationary
distribution of the Markov chain with transition rates given in Equation (6).16 The set
of stochastically stable networks is denoted by Ωˆ ≡ {G ∈ Ω : µ(G) > 0}. We will
analyze these states in Section 4, while we will study the sample paths generated by the
chain when ζ is zero in the next section. We refer to this case (ζ = 0) as the unperturbed
dynamics, while the case of noise (ζ > 0) is referred to as perturbed dynamics.
3.3. Network Formation and Nested Split Graphs
In this section wewill focus on the unperturbed dynamics of the Markov chain intro-
duced inDefinition 2. An essential property of the chain is that it produces networks in a
well defined class of graphs denoted by “nested split graphs” [Cvetkovic and Rowlinson,
1990].17 We will give a formal definition of these graphs and discuss an example in this
section. Nested split graphs include many common networks such as the star network.
Moreover, as their name already indicates, they have a nested neighborhood structure. This
means that the set of neighbors of each agent is contained in the set of neighbors of each
higher degree agent. Nested split graphs have particular topological properties and an
associated adjacency matrix with a well defined structure.
In order to characterize nested split graphs, it will be necessary to consider the de-
gree partition of a graph, which is defined as follows:
Definition 3 (Mahadev and Peled [1995]). Let G = (N , E) be a graph whose distinct posi-
tive degrees are d(1) < d(2) < . . . < d(k), and let d0 = 0 (even if no agent with degree 0 exists
in G). Further, define Di = {v ∈ N : dv = d(i)} for i = 0, . . . , k. Then the set-valued vector
D = (D0,D1, . . . ,Dk) is called the degree partition of G.
With the definition of a degree partition, we can now give a more formal definition
of a nested split graph.18,19
16See also Young [1998, Chap. 3] and Sandholm [2010, Chap. 12].
17Nested split graphs are also called “threshold networks” [Hagberg et al., 2006; Mahadev and Peled,
1995].
18 Let x be a real valued number x ∈ R. Then, ⌈x⌉ denotes the smallest integer larger or equal than x
(the ceiling of x). Similarly, ⌊x⌋ denotes the largest integer smaller or equal than x (the floor of x).
19In general, split graphs are graphs whose nodes can be partitioned in a set of nodes which are all
12
Definition 4 (Mahadev and Peled [1995]). Consider a nested split graph G = (N , E) and
let D = (D0,D1, . . . ,Dk) be its degree partition. Then the nodes N can be partitioned in
independent sets Di, i = 1, . . . ,
⌊
k
2
⌋
and a dominating set
⋃k
i=⌊ k2⌋+1
Di in the graph G
′ =
(N\D0, E). Moreover, the neighborhoods of the nodes are nested. In particular, for each node
v ∈ Di, i = 1, . . . , k,
Nv =


⋃i
j=1Dk+1−j if i = 1, . . . ,
⌊
k
2
⌋
,⋃i
j=1Dk+1−j \ {v} if i =
⌊
k
2
⌋
+ 1, . . . , k.
(7)
Figure 1 (left) illustrates the degree partition D = (D0,D1, . . . ,D6) and the nested
neighborhood structure of a nested split graph. A line between Di and Dj indicates
that every node in Di is linked to every node in Dj for any i, j = 1, . . . , 6. The nodes in
the dominating set included in the solid frame induce a clique while the nodes in the
independent sets that are included in the dashed frame induce an empty subgraph. In
the following we will call the sets Di, i =
⌊
k
2
⌋
+ 1, . . . , k, dominating subsets, since the
set Di induces a dominating set in the graph obtained by removing the nodes in the set⋃k−i
j=0Dj from G.
A nested split graph has an associated adjacency matrix which is called stepwise ma-
trix and it is defined as follows:
Definition 5 (Brualdi and Hoffman [1985]). A stepwise matrix A is a symmetric, binary
(n × n)-matrix with elements aij satisfying the condition: if i < j and aij = 1 then ahk = 1
whenever h < k ≤ j and h ≤ i.
Figure 1 (right) shows the stepwise adjacency matrix A corresponding to the nested
split graph shown on the left hand side. If we let the nodes by indexed by the order of
the rows in the adjacency matrix A then it is easily seen that for example D6 = {1, 2 ∈
N : d1 = d2 = d(6) = 9} and D1 = {9, 10 ∈ N : d9 = d10 = d(1) = 2}.
If a nested split graph is connected we call it a connected nested split graph. The rep-
resentation and the adjacency matrix depicted in Figure 1 actually shows a connected
nested split graph. From the stepwise property of the adjacency matrix it follows that a
connected nested split graph contains at least one spanning star, that is, there is at least
one agent that is connected to all other agents. In the supplementary Appendix C, we
also derive the clustering coefficient, the neighbor connectivity and the characteristic
path length of a nested split graph. In particular, we show that connected nested split
graphs have small characteristic path length, which is at most two. We also analyze
different measures of centrality (see Wasserman and Faust [1994, Chap. 5.2]) in a nested
connected among each other and sets of nodes which are disconnected. A nested split graph is a special
case of a split graph.
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D1
D2
D3D4
D5
D6 d(1) = 2
d(2) = 3
d(3) = 4d(4) = 5
d(5) = 7
d(6) = 9
A =


0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 0
1 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 0
1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0


Figure 1: Representation of a connected nested split graph (left) and the associated adjacency matrix
(right) with n = 10 agents and k = 6 distinct positive degrees. A line between Di and Dj indicates that
every node inDi is linked to every node inDj. The solid frame indicates the dominating set and the nodes
in the independent sets are included in the dashed frame. Next to the setDi the degree of the nodes in the
set is indicated. The neighborhoods are nested such that the degrees are given by d(i+1) = d(i)+ |Dk−i+1|
for i 6=
⌊
k
2
⌋
and d(i+1) = d(i) + |Dk−i+1| − 1 for i =
⌊
k
2
⌋
. In the corresponding adjacency matrix A to the
right the zero-entries are separated from the one-entries by a stepfunction.
split graph. One important result is that degree, closeness, and Bonacich centrality in-
duce the same ordering of nodes in a nested split graph. If the ordering is not strict,
then this holds also for betweenness centrality (see Section C.2.5 in the supplementary
appendix).
In the next proposition, we identify the relationship between the Bonacich centrality
of an agent and her degree in a nested split graph. Denote by G⊕ (i, j), the network G
for which a link between i and j has been added and G⊖ (i, j), the network G for which
the link between i and j has been deleted. We have:
Proposition 1. Consider a pair of agents i, j ∈ N of a nested split graph G = (N , E).
(i) If and only if agent i has a higher degree than agent j then i has a higher Bonacich centrality
than j, i.e. di > dj ⇔ bi(G, λ) > bj(G, λ).
(ii) Assume that neither the links (i, k) nor (i, j) are in G, (i, j) /∈ E and (i, k) /∈ E . Further
assume that agent k has a higher degree than agent j, dk > dj. Then adding the link (i, k)
to G increases the Bonacich centrality of agent i more than adding the link (i, j) to G, i.e.
dk > dj ⇔ bi(G⊕ (i, k), λ) > bi(G⊕ (i, j), λ).
(iii) Consider two agents j, k ∈ Ni, and assume that agent k has a higher degree than agent
j, dk > dj. Then removing the link (i, k) from G decreases the Bonacich centrality of
agent i more than removing the link (i, j) from G, i.e. dk > dj ⇔ bi(G ⊖ (i, k), λ) <
bi(G⊖ (i, j), λ).
From part (ii) of Proposition 1 we find that when agent i has to decide to create a
link either to agents k or j, with dk > dj, in the link formation process (G(t))t∈R+ then i
will always connect to agent k because this link gives i a higher Bonacich centrality than
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the other link to agent j. A similar argument holds for the removal of a link in part (iii).
We can make use of this property in order to show that the networks emerging from the
link formation process defined in the previous section actually are nested split graphs.
This result is stated in the next proposition.
Proposition 2. Consider the unperturbed dynamics of the network formation process (G(t))t∈R+
introduced in Definition 2. Assume that, at t = 0, we start with the empty network G(0) = K¯n.
Then, at any time t ≥ 0, the network G(t) is a nested split graph almost surely, and the set
Ψ ∈ Ω consisting of all possible unlabeled nested split graphs on n nodes with |Ψ| = 2n−1 has
measure P(Ψ) = 1.
This result is due to the fact that agents, when they have the possibility of creating a
new link, always connect to the agent who has the highest Bonacich centrality (and by
Proposition 1 the highest degree). This creates a nested neighborhood structure which
can always be represented by a stepwise adjacency matrix after a possible relabeling of
the agents.20 The same applies for link decay.
Let us give some more intuition of this crucial result. Agents want to link to others
who are more central since this leads to higher actions (as actions are proportional to
centrality) and higher actions raise payoffs more. Similarly, links decay to those with
lower centrality as these agents have lower actions and hence lower payoff effects. No-
tice moreover that, once a link decays to an agent, she becomes less central and this
makes it more likely that another link decays. Thus link gains and losses are self rein-
forcing. This intuition suggests that if α, the probability of adding links is large then
the process should approximate complete network while if it is small then the process
should approximate the star network. The key insight of our model is that for interme-
diate values of α the network is a nested split graph.
Observe that it is assumed that there is no cost of forming links. If links represent
a social tie, then there typically is a cost to maintaining a link since agents must spend
time with the person they are linked to. Because of the assumption of the absence of
any linking cost, each agent wants to connect to every other agent, which leads to the
formation of nested split graphs. In the supplementary Appendix E, we extend the
model to see what would happen to ours results if links were costly to maintain and
only the links that increase the payoff of an agent were formed. We show that as long as
the cost is not too high, marginal payoffs are positive and the networks always converge
to nested split graphs so that all our results hold.
Due to the nested neighborhood structure of nested split graphs, any pair of agents
in (the connected component) of a nested split graph is at most two links separated
20Further, we will show in Proposition 3 that as ζ converges to zero, (G(t))t∈R+ induces a finite state
Markov chain where the recurrent states Ωˆ consist of nested split graphs.
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from each other. From Proposition 1 it then follows that in a nested split graph G(t) the
best response of an agent i are the agents with the highest degrees in i’s second-order
neighborhood N
(2)
i .
21 Moreover, if G(t) is a nested split graph then i ∈ Bj(G(t)) if and
only if j ∈ Bi(G(t)). Hence, we could require in addition that links are only formed
under mutual consent.
From the fact that G(t) is a nested split graph with an associated stepwise adjacency
matrix it further follows that at any time t in the network evolution, G(t) consists of a
single connected component and possibly isolated nodes.
Corollary 1. Consider the unperturbed dynamics of the network formation process (G(t))t∈R+
introduced in Definition 2. Assume that at t = 0, we start with the empty network G(0) = K¯n.
Then, at any time t ≥ 0, the network G(t) has at most one non-singleton component almost
surely.
Nested split graphs are not only prominent in the literature on spectral graph theory
but they have also appeared in the recent literature on economic networks. Nested
split graphs are so called “inter-linked stars” in Goyal and Joshi [2003].22 Subsequently,
Goyal et al. [2006] identified inter-linked stars in the network of scientific collaborations
among economists. It is important to note that nested split graphs are characterized by
a distinctive core-periphery structure (see the introduction in Section 1 and Section 6).
Finally, note that the network formation process (G(t))t∈R+ introduced in Definition
2 is independent of initial conditions G(0).23 This means that even when we start from
an initial network G(0) which is not a nested split graph then after some finite time the
Markov chain will reach a nested split graph. This is because there exists a positive
probability that all links in the current graph are removed. The resulting graph is then
empty. This graph is a special case of a nested split graph. Due to Proposition 2 for
ζ = 0 from then on all consecutive networks visited by the chain are nested split graphs,
and the class of nested split graphs will never be left by the chain, that is, it forms an
absorbing set. Moreover, since the chain stays forever in the class of nested split graphs
and it takes only a finite number of transitions to reach this class from any other graph,
all other graphs form a transient set.
21Let Ni = {k ∈ N : (i, k) ∈ E (t)} be the set of neighbors of agent i ∈ N and N
(2)
i =⋃
j∈Ni
Nj\ (Ni ∪ {i}) denote the second-order neighbors of agent i in the current network G(t). Note
that the connectivity relation is symmetric such that j is a second-order neighbor of i if i is a second-order
neighbor of j, i.e. i ∈ N
(2)
j if and only if j ∈ N
(2)
i for all i, j ∈ N .
22Nested split graphs are inter-linked stars but an inter-linked star is not necessarily a nested split
graph. Nested split graphs have a nested neighborhood structure for all degrees while in an inter-linked
star this holds only for the nodes with the lowest and highest degrees.
23See Proposition 3 in Section 4 and its proof in Appendix A.
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4. Stochastically Stable Networks: Characterization
In this section we show that the network formation process (G(t))t∈R+ of Definition
2 induces an ergodic Markov chain with a unique invariant distribution. We then pro-
ceed by analyzing the stochastically stables states in Ωˆ (in the limit of ζ → 0) of this
process as the number n of agents becomes large.
Proposition 3. The network formation process (G(t))t∈R+ introduced in Definition 2 induces
an ergodic Markov chain on the finite state space Ω with a unique stationary distribution µζ
such that µζ(G′) = limt→∞ P(G(t) = G
′|G(0) = G) for any G,G′ ∈ Ω. Moreover, the
stochastically stable states Ωˆ are given by the set of nested split graphs Ψ such that µ(Ψ) = 1.
In the following we will assume for simplicity that αi = 1− βi = α for all i ∈ N in
Definition 2, expressing the relative weights of link creation versus link decay.24 In this
case, the symmetry of the network formation process with respect to the link arrival rate
α and the link decay parameter 1− α allows us to state the following proposition.
Proposition 4. Consider the unperturbed dynamics of the Markov chain (G(t))t∈R+ in Defi-
nition 2 with α ≡ αi = 1− βi for all i ∈ N . Let G(t) be a sample path generated with the
homogeneous link arrival rate α, and let G′(t) be a sample path with arrival rate 1− α. Let
µ be the stationary distribution of G(t) and µ′ the stationary distribution of G′(t). Then for
each network G in the support of µ the complement G¯ of G has the same probability in µ′, i.e.
µ′(G¯) = µ(G).
Proposition 4 allows us to derive the stationary distribution µ for any value of 1/2 <
α < 1 if we know the corresponding distribution for 1 − α. This follows from the
fact that the complement G¯ of a nested split graph G is a nested split graph as well
[Mahadev and Peled, 1995]. In particular, the networks G¯ are nested split graphs in
which the number of nodes in the dominating subsets corresponds to the number of
nodes in the independent sets in G and, conversely, the number of nodes in the inde-
pendent sets in G¯ corresponds to the number of nodes in the dominating subsets in
G.
With this symmetry in mind we restrict our analysis in the following to the case
of 0 < α ≤ 1/2. Let {N(t)}t∈R+ be the degree distribution with the d-th element
Nd(t), giving the number of nodes with degree d in G(t), in the t-th sequence N(t) ≡
{Nd(t)}
n−1
d=0 . Further, let Pt(d) ≡ Nd(t)/n denote the proportion of nodes with degree
24Note that taking into account the possibility of an agent remaining quiescent only modifies the time-
scale of the process discussed, thus yielding identical results to the model proposed. This implies that,
without any loss of generality, it is possible to assume αi + βi = 1 for all i ∈ N . For simplicity, we also
assume that these probabilities are the same across agents.
17
d (P(t) ≡ 1nN(t)) and let P(d) ≡ limt→∞ Pt(d) be its asymptotic value. In the follow-
ing proposition we determine the asymptotic degree distribution of the nodes in the
independent sets for n large enough.25
Proposition 5. Consider the unperturbed dynamics of the Markov chain (G(t))t∈R+ in Def-
inition 2 with α ≡ αi = 1− βi for all i ∈ N and let 0 < α ≤ 1/2. Let Pt(d) denote the
proportion of nodes with degree d in G(t). Then the asymptotic expected proportion of nodes in
the independent sets with degrees, d = 0, 1, . . . , d∗, in the stochastically stable networks G ∈ Ωˆ
for large n is given by
lim
t→∞
E (Pt(d)) =
1− 2α
1− α
(
α
1− α
)d
, (8)
where26
d∗(n, α) =
ln
(
(1−2α)n
2(1−α)
)
ln
(
1−α
α
) , (9)
and Pt(d) → Et (Pt(d)) almost surely as n→ ∞.
The proof of the proposition follows from a series of intermediate steps, where we
can take advantage of the intuitively simple stepwise structure of the adjacency matrix
associated with a nested split graph (cf. Figure 1). First we use the fact that we can ap-
proximate the continuous timeMarkov chain with a sampled timeMarkov chain whose
stationary distributions are the same (see Lemma 1 in Appendix A). We then proceed by
induction to show that Equation (8) holds for all degrees smaller than an upper bound
d∗ in the support of the stationary distribution µ of the sampled time Markov chain.
The induction basis is concerned with the number of isolated nodes (separately derived
in Lemma 3 in Appendix A) and the number of nodes with degree one. The induction
step assumes that Equation (8) holds for d− 1 and d, to show that it then must also hold
for d+ 1. In order to draw this conclusion we compute the fixed point of the expected
change in the number of nodes with degree d in an incremental time step using the fact
that the underlying network is a nested split graph. This is possible because of the par-
ticular structure inherent in the adjacency matrix of a nested split graph and our payoff
maximizing link formation protocol, which allows us to consider only a few cases for
the formation or removal of a link to compute that change. Finally, by requiring that the
degree distribution is a proper probability measure with mass one, we can derive d∗ in
Equation (9). The details of the proof can be found in Appendix A.
25As Proposition 5 speaks of the asymptotic degree distribution in the limit of large n, this is to be
understood as letting n→ ∞ after considering the limit of t → ∞.
26Note that d∗(n, α) from Equation (9) might in general not be an integer. In this case we take the
closest integer value to Equation (9), that is, we take [d∗(n, α)] = ⌊d∗(n, α) + 12⌋. The error we make in
this approximation is negligible for large n.
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The structure of nested split graphs implies that if there exist nodes for all degrees
between 0 and d∗ (in the independent sets), then the dominating subsets with degrees
larger than d∗ contain only a single node. Further, using Proposition 4, we know that
for α > 1/2 the expected number of nodes in the dominating subsets is given by the
expected number of nodes in the independent sets in Equation (8) for 1− α, while each
of the independent sets contains a single node. This determines the asymptotic degree
distribution for the independent or dominating subsets, respectively, for all values of α
in the limit of large n.
From Equation (9) we can directly derive the following corollary.
Corollary 2. Consider the unperturbed dynamics of theMarkov chain (G(t))t∈R+ in Definition
2 with αi = 1− βi = α for all i ∈ N . Then there exists a phase transition in the asymptotic
average number of independent sets, d∗(n, α), for G ∈ Ωˆ as n becomes large such that
lim
n→∞
d∗(n, α)
n
=


0, if α < 12 ,
1
2 , if α =
1
2 ,
1, if α > 12 .
(10)
Corollary 2 implies that as n grows without bound the networks in the stationary
distribution µ are either sparse or dense, depending on the value of the link creation
probability α. Moreover, from the functional form of d(n, α) in Equation (9) we find that
there exists a sharp transition from sparse to dense networks as α crosses 1/2 and the
transition becomes sharper the larger is n.
Observe that, because a nested split graph is uniquely defined by its degree distribu-
tion,27 Proposition 5 delivers us a complete description of a typical network generated
by our model in the limit of large t and n. We call this network the “stationary network”.
We can compute the degree distribution and the corresponding adjacency matrix of the
stationary network for different values of α.28 The latter is shown in Figure 2. From the
structure of these matrices we observe the transition from sparse networks containing
a hub and many agents with small degree to a quite homogeneous network with many
agents having similar high degrees. Moreover, this transition is sharp around α = 1/2.
In Figure 3, we show particular networks arising from the network formation process
for the same values of α. Again, we can identify the sharp transition from hub-like
networks to homogeneous, almost complete networks.
Figure 4 (left) displays the number m¯ of links m relative to the total number of possi-
27The degree distribution uniquely determines the corresponding nested split graph up to a permuta-
tion of the indices of nodes.
28Non-integer values for the partition sizes can be approximatedwith the closest integer while preserv-
ing the nested structure of the degree partitions.
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Figure 2: Representation of the adjacency matrices of stationary networks with n = 1000 agents for
different values of parameter α: α = 0.2 (top-left plot), α = 0.4 (top-center plot), α = 0.48 (top-right plot),
α = 0.495 (bottom-left plot), α = 0.5 (bottom-center plot), and α = 0.52 (bottom-right plot). The solid line
illustrates the stepfunction separating the zero from the one entries in the matrix. The matrix top-left for
α = 0.4 is corresponding to a star-like network while the matrix bottom-right for α = 0.52 corresponds
to an almost complete network. Thus, there exists a sharp transition from sparse to densely connected
stationary networks around α = 0.5. Networks of smaller size for the same values of α can be seen in
Figure 3.
ble links n(n− 1)/2, i.e. m¯ = 2m
n(n−1) , and the number of distinct degrees k as a function
of α. We see that there exists a sharp transition from sparse to dense networks around
α = 1/2 while k reaches a maximum at α = 1/2. This follows from the fact that k = 2d∗
with d∗ given in Equation (9) is monotonic increasing in α for α < 1/2 and monotonic
decreasing in α for α > 1/2.
Note that Proposition 5 makes a statement in the limit of n → ∞. In the follow-
ing section (see in particular Figures 4 to 8) we compare various networks statistics
computed from the analytical solution in Proposition 5 with the results obtained from
numerical simulations for finite values of n. These figures illustrate that for relatively
small values of n there is almost no deviation from the theoretical prediction of Proposi-
tion 5, providing evidence that our limit results make reasonably good predictions also
in the case of a finite number n of agents.29
5. Stochastically Stable Networks: Statistics
In the following sections, we analyze some of the topological properties of the stochas-
tically stable networks in our model that are in the support of the stationary distribu-
29This also weakens the eigenvalue condition imposed on the spillover parameter λ introduced in
Section 3.1. See also Footnote 10.
20
Figure 3: Sample networks with n = 50 agents for different values of parameter α: α = 0.2 (top-left
plot), α = 0.4 (top-center plot), α = 0.48 (top-right plot), α = 0.495 (bottom-left plot), α = 0.5 (bottom-
center plot), and α = 0.52 (bottom-right plot). The shade and size of the nodes indicate their eigenvector
centrality. The networks for small values of α are characterized by the presence of a hub and a growing
cluster attached to the hub. With increasing values of α the density of the network increases until the
network becomes almost complete.
tion µ. We simply refer to these networks as stationary networks. With the asymptotic
expected degree distribution derived in Proposition 5, we can calculate the expected
clustering coefficient, the clustering-degree correlation, the neighbor connectivity, the
assortativity, and the characteristic path length by using the expressions derived for
these quantities in the supplementary Appendix C, where we show that these statistics
are all functions of the degree distribution.30
Note that since the stationary distribution µ is unique, we can recover the expected
value of any statistic by averaging over a large enough sample of empirical networks
generated by numerical simulations. We then superimpose the analytical predictions of
the statistic derived from Proposition 5 with the sample averages in order to compare
the validity of our theoretical results, also for small network sizes n. As we will show,
there is a good agreement of the theory with the empirical results for all n.
We would like now to investigate the properties of our networks and see how they
30Any network statistic f : Ω → R we consider can be expressed as a function of the (empir-
ical) degree distribution Pt : Ω → [0, 1]n. Hence, we can compute the expectation as Et ( f ) =
∑k∈(0,...,n)n f (k/n)Pt (Pt = k/n). In Proposition 5 we show that the degree distribution converges to its
expected value with probability one. Therefore, we have that Et ( f ) = ∑k∈(0,...,n)n f (k/n)1Et(Pt)(k/n) =
f (Et(Pt)) as n → ∞.
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Figure 4: (Left) In the top panel we show the number m¯ of links m relative to the total number of pos-
sible links n(n− 1)/2 of the stationary network. The number of distinct degrees k = 2d∗, with d∗ from
Equation (9), found in the stationary network for different values of α are shown in the bottom panel. The
figures display both, the results obtained by recourse of numerical simulations (symbols) and respect-
ing theoretical predictions (lines) of the model. (Right) Degree distribution P(d) for different values of
parameter α and a network size n = 10 000: α = 0.2 (top-left plot), α = 0.4 (top-center plot), α = 0.48 (top-
right plot), α = 0.49 (bottom-left plot), α = 0.5 (bottom-center plot), and α = 0.52 (bottom-right plot). The
solid line corresponds to the average of simulations while the dashed line indicates the theoretical degree
distribution from Proposition 5. The degrees have been binned to smoothen the degree distribution.
match real-world networks.
Degree Distribution. From Proposition 5, we find that the degree distribution follows
an exponential decay with a power-law tail.31 The power-law tail has an exponent of
minus one.32 Figure 4 displays the relative degree in the network (left panel) and the
degree distribution (right panel).
Clustering. The clustering coefficient is shown in Figure 5 (left). We find that for practi-
cally all values of α, the clustering in the stationary networks is high. This finding is in
agreement with the vast literature on social networks that have reported high clustering
being a distinctive feature of social networks. Moreover, Goyal et al. [2006] have shown
31For 0 < α ≤ 1/2 and n large enough the asymptotic expected degree distribution for the degrees d
smaller or equal than d∗ is given by an exponential function P(d) = 1−2α1−α exp
(
− ln
(
1−α
α
)
d
)
. On the
other hand, if we assume (i) that the degree of a node in a dominating subset is symmetrically distributed
around its expected value, (ii) we compute the integral over the probability density function by a rectangle
approximation and (iii) further assume that the degree distribution obtained in this way has the same
functional form for all degrees d larger than d∗ then one can show that for 0 < α ≤ 1/2 and n large
enough the asymptotic expected degree distribution P(d) is given by P(d) = α
(1−2α)nd
−1. The power-law
tail of the degree distribution can be confirmed by the empirical distribution from a logarithmic binning
of numerical simulations, as can be seen in Figure 4 (right).
32We can extend our model to obtain a degree distribution with an arbitrary power-law tail by mak-
ing the probability of selecting an agent depending on the number of links she already has, while pre-
serving the nested structure of the network she is embedded in. This extension is further discussed in
Ko¨nig and Tessone [2011].
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Figure 5: The left panel shows the clustering coefficient C and the right panel the clustering-degree cor-
relation of stationary networks. The symbols correspond to the results obtained by recourse of numerical
simulations. The solid lines correspond to the analytical results. We show that the clustering-degree cor-
relation is negative for different values of α and a network size of n = 1000. The different plots show
different values of α: α = 0.2 (top-left plot), α = 0.4 (top-center plot), α = 0.48 (top-right plot), α = 0.49
(bottom-left plot), α = 0.5 (bottom-center plot), and α = 0.52 (bottom-right plot).
that there exists a negative correlation between the clustering coefficient of an agent and
her degree. We find this property in the stationary networks as well, as it is shown in
Figure 5 (right).
Assortativity and Nearest Neighbor Connectivity. We now turn to the study of correlations
between the degrees of the agents and their neighbors. This property is usually mea-
sured by the network assortativity γ [Newman, 2002]33 and nearest neighbor connectiv-
ity dnn(d) [Pastor-Satorras et al., 2001]. Dissortative networks are characterized by neg-
ative degree correlations between a node and its neighbors and assortative networks
show positive degree correlations. In dissortative networks γ is negative and dnn(d)
monotonic decreasing while in assortative networks γ is positive and dnn(d)monotonic
increasing. In our model, we observe dissortative networks.34
Assortativity and average nearest neighbor connectivity for different values of the
link creation probability α are shown in Figure 6. Clearly, stationary networks are dis-
sortative while the degree of dissortativity decreases with increasing α. The dissortativ-
ity of stationary networks simply reflects the fact that stationary networks are strongly
centralized for values of α below 1/2.
33 The assortativity coefficient γ ∈ [−1, 1] is essentially the Pearson correlation coefficient of degree
between nodes that are connected. Positive values of γ indicate that nodes with similar degrees tend to
be connected (and dnn(d) is an increasing function of the degree d) while negative values indicate that
nodes with different degrees tend to be connected (and dnn(d) is a decreasing function of the degree d).
See Newman [2002] for further details.
34In Ko¨nig et al. [2010], we show that, by introducing capacity constraints in the number of links an
agent can maintain, we are able to produce both, assortative as well as dissortative networks.
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Figure 6: In the left panel we show the assortativity γ of stationary networks. In the right panel we
show the average nearest neighbor connectivity dnn for α = 0.2 (top-left plot), α = 0.4 (top-center plot),
α = 0.48 (top-right plot), α = 0.49 (bottom-left plot), α = 0.5 (bottom-center plot), and α = 0.52 (bottom-
right plot). The symbols correspond to the results obtained by recourse of numerical simulations. The
solid lines correspond to the analytical results.
Figure 7: (Left panel) The characteristic path length ℓ of stationary networks and (right panel) the results
for the network efficiency ǫ, obtained by recourse of numerical simulations (symbols) and respecting
theoretical predictions (lines) of the model.
Characteristic Path Length. Figure 7 shows the characteristic path length ℓ and the net-
work efficiency ǫ (defined in Section C.1.4 in the supplementary Appendix C). From
these figures one can see that the characteristic path length ℓ never exceeds a distance of
two. Together with the high clustering shown in this section the stationary networks can
be seen as “small worlds” [Watts and Strogatz, 1998]. Stationary networks are efficient
for values of α larger than 1/2, in terms of short average distance between agents, while
for values of α smaller than 1/2 they are not. However, this short average distance is
attained at the expense of a large number of links.
Centralization of Stochastically Stable Networks. In the following section, we analyze the
degree of centralization in stationary networks.
For our analysis, we use the centralization index introduced by Freeman [1979]. The
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Figure 8: (From left to right) Degree, closeness, betweenness and eigenvector centralization in the sta-
tionary networks for different values of α. For all centralization measures we obtain a sharp transition
between strongly centralized networks for lower values of α and decentralized networks for higher val-
ues of α. Note that we have only considered the connected component for the computation of the different
centralization measures.
centralization C : Ω → [0, 1] of a network G = (N , E) ∈ Ω is given by
C ≡
∑u∈G (C(u
∗)− C(u))
maxG′ ∑v∈G′ (C(v
∗)− C(v))
, (11)
where u∗ and v∗ are the agents with the highest values of centrality in the current
network and and the maximum in the denominator is computed over all networks
G′ = (N , E ′) ∈ Ω with the same number of agents.
From Figure 8 (right), showing degree, closeness, betweenness and eigenvector cen-
tralization, we clearly see that there exists a phase transition at α = 1/2 from highly
centralized to highly decentralized networks. This means that for low arrival rates of
linking opportunities α (and a strong link decay) the stationary network is strongly po-
larized, composed mainly of a star (or an inter-linked star as in Goyal and Joshi [2003]),
while for high arrival rates of linking opportunities (and a weak link decay) stationary
networks are largely homogeneous. We can also see that the transition between these
states is sharp. It is interesting to note that the same pattern emerges for all centrality
measures considered, irrespective of whether the measures takes into account only the
local neighborhood of an agent, such as in the case of degree centrality, or the entire
network structure, as for the other centrality measures.
6. Empirical Implications
6.1. Data
In this section we would like to provide real-world evidence for our model and es-
timate the model’s parameters for four different empirical data sets, all of which are
characterized by a strongly nested network architecture. We essentially consider two
types of networks: bank and trade networks.35 In the following we describe in detail
35In Appendix D, we discuss an application of our model to networks of banks (see Appendix D.1),
where links are loans between banks, and, in terms of trade networks (see Appendix D.2), where links
between countries represent trade relationships (in imports or exports).
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Figure 9: The Austrian banking network, the global network of banks obtained from the Bank of Interna-
tional Settlements (BIS) locational statistics, the GDP trade network and the arms trade network (from left
to right). The shade and size of the nodes indicate their eigenvector centrality. The GDP trade network is
much more dense than the network of banks and the network of arms trade. All four networks show a
core of densely connected nodes.
the different datasets that we use.
The first network we analyze is a network of Austrian banks in the year 2008 [cf.
Boss et al., 2004]. Links in the network represent exposures betweenAustrian-domiciled
banks on a non-consolidated basis (i.e. no exposures to foreign subsidiaries are in-
cluded). We obtain a sample of n = 770 banks with m = 2454 links between them
and an average degree of d¯ = 20.54. The degree variance is σ2d = 1273.22. The largest
connected component comprises 768 banks, which is 99.7% of the total of banks, and it
is illustrated in Figure 9.
Secondly, we consider the global banking network in the year 2011 obtained from the
Bank of International Settlements (BIS) locational statistics on exchange-rate adjusted
changes in cross-border bank claims [cf. Minoiu and Reyes, 2011]. BIS locational statis-
tics are compiled on the basis of residence of BIS reporting banks and cover the cross-
border positions of all banks domiciled in the reporting area, including positions with
respect to foreign affiliates, loans, deposits, debt securities, and other assets provided
by banks. We obtain a network with n = 239 nodes and m = 2454 links between them.
An illustration can be seen in Figure 9. The average degree of the network is d¯ = 20.54
and we observe a high degree variance of σ2d = 1273.22.
The third empirical network we consider is the network of trade relationships be-
tween countries in the year 2000. The trade network is defined as the network of import-
export relationships between countries in a given year in millions of current-year U.S.
dollars. We construct an undirected network in which a link is present between two
countries if either one has exported to the other country. The trade network contains
n = 196 nodes, m = 4138 links, has an average degree of d¯ = 42.22 and a degree
variance of σ2d = 1524.16.
Fourth, we consider the network of arms trade between countries [cf. A˚kerman and Larsson,
2010]. We use data obtained from the SIPRI Arms Transfers Database holding informa-
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tion on all international transfers between countries of seven categories of major con-
ventional weapons accumulated from 1950 to 2010. A link in the network represents
a recipient or supply relationship of arms between two countries during this period.
We obtain a network with n = 246 nodes and m = 2245 links. The average degree is
d¯ = 18.25 and the degree variance is σ2d = 589.97. An illustration can be seen in Figure
9.
All these four real-world networks are of similar size, show short average path
lengths of around 2, are dissortative and have a monotonic decreasing average near-
est neighbor connectivity. They also show a relatively high clustering and the clustering
degree distribution is decreasing with the degree (see Figure 11). An important feature
of these networks is that they all show a high degree of nestedness. This can be witnessed
from the adjacency matrices depicted in Figure 10, which resemble the nested matrices
we derive from our theoretical model (see Figure 2). Similarly, when we compare the
networks simulated from our model (see Figure 3) and the ones described in real-world
networks (Figure 9), they are relatively similar (in terms of a clear core-periphery struc-
ture indicating nestedness).36,37
6.2. Estimating the Model’s Parameters
We then estimate themain parameters θ ≡ (α, ζ) of ourmodel by using the Likelihood-
Free Markov Chain Monte Carlo (LF-MCMC) algorithm suggested by Marjoram et al.
[2003]. The purpose of this algorithm is to estimate the parameter vector θ of our model
on the basis of the summary statistics S ≡ (S1,S2,S3)n×3, where S1 ≡ (P(d))
n−1
d=0 ,
S2 ≡ (C(d))
n−1
d=0 , S3 ≡ (dnn(d))
n−1
d=0 are the degree distribution, the clustering degree dis-
tribution and the average nearest neighbor degree distribution, respectively. Moment
conditions are obtained from the Euclidean distances ∆(Si,S
o
i ) ≡
√
∑
n
j=1
(
Si,j − S
o
i,j
)2
36We have performed a k-core decomposition of the empirical networks. A k-core is a maximal subnet-
work in which all nodes have a degree of at least kwith the other nodes in the subnetwork. Examining the
k-cores with increasing values of k does not split the network into separate components. This is another
indicator for the nested structure observed in these networks.
37We can complement these observations of nested patterns in real-world networks by a rigorous sta-
tistical analysis. The key question is how to measure, precisely, the degree of nestedness of a network.
For that, we have computed the degree of nestedness by calculating the matrix temperature Tn using the
BINMATNEST algorithm proposed by Rodrı´guez-Girone´s and Santamarı´a [2006]. Typically, the lower the
temperature Tn, the higher the degree of nestedness. More precisely, Tn is normalized in such a way
that it ranges between 0 for a perfectly nested matrix and 100 for a maximally “unnested” matrix. For
the network of Austrian banks we obtain Tn = 0.05, for the network of banks from BIS statistics we get
Tn = 0.75, for the trade network we obtain Tn = 7.26, and for the arms trade network Tn = 1.72. This
indicates that the networks of banks have the highest degree of nestedness. Moreover, we can also com-
pute the probability of a certain degree of nestedness being generated at random. For all the networks
considered we obtain a p-value not distinguishable from zero (using 500 null matrices) showing that all
empirical networks are significantly nested. See Rodrı´guez-Girone´s and Santamarı´a [2006] for further
details of the BINMATNEST algorithm.
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Figure 10: Adjacency matrices (sorted by the eigenvector centralities of the nodes) for the Austrian bank-
ing network, the global network of banks obtained from the Bank of International Settlements (BIS) lo-
cational statistics, the GDP trade network and the arms trade network (from left to right). All adjacency
matrices are significantly nested.
for each statistic Si (generated by the algorithm) and its observed value S
o
i . The algo-
rithm generates a Markov chain which is a sequence of parameters {θs}Ss=1 with a sta-
tionary distribution that approximates the distribution of the parameter values θ condi-
tional on the observed statistic S o.38 Since this estimation algorithm would require the
computation of the Bonacich centrality an extensive number of times, we assume that
the complementarity parameter λ is small such that we can approximate the Bonacich
centrality by the degree centrality when simulating the network formation process.39,40
The estimated parameter values are shown in Table 1. We observe that the estimates
for ζ are higher for the network of GDP trading countries and the network of arms trade
than the corresponding estimates for the networks of banks. This confirms our intuition
that with increasing values of ζ stationary networks become less nested (and we obtain
a random graph as ζ → ∞), and the lower values for the matrix temperature Tn for these
networks (see also the adjacency matrices in Figure 10). Hence, our estimates support
our earlier observation that the networks of banks have a higher degree of nestedness
than the networks of trade relationships between countries.
Moreover, Figure 11 shows the empirical distributions (squares) and typical simu-
38For the implementation of the algorithm we have chosen an initial uniform (prior) parameter distri-
bution. The proposal distribution is a normal distribution. During the “burn-in” phase [Chib, 2001], we
consider a monotonic decreasing sequence of thresholds with appropriately chosen values from careful
numerical experimentation. For the Austrian banking network we have chosen a burn-in period of 1000
steps, while for the network of GDP trade we have used a period of 3000.
39The Bonacich centrality is defined by bi(G, λ) = ∑
∞
k=0 λ
k
(
Ak · u
)
i
= 1 + λdi + λ
2 ∑j∈Ni dj +
λ3 ∑j∈Ni ∑k∈Nj dk + . . . = 1+ λdi + λ
2 ∑j∈Ni dj +O(λ
3). Marginal payoff from forming a link (i, j) for
agent i can then be written as π∗i (G⊕ (i, j), λ)− π
∗
i (G, λ) =
λ(2+λ)
2 +
λ2
2 di(di + 1) + λ
2dj +O(λ
3). When
computingmarginal payoffs from forming a link (and the decay rates) we ignore terms of the orderO(λ3).
40Note also that the reported estimates of ζ hold only up to a scaling factor, which depends on the
choice of λ. Hence, only the relative values of ζ between different samples is meaningful but not its
absolute value.
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Figure 11: The empirical (✷) and an exemplary simulated (◦) degree distribution P(d), average nearest
neighbor degree dnn(d) and clustering degree distribution C(d) for the Austrian banking network (first
column), the network of banks obtained from the Bank of International Settlements (BIS) (second column),
the GDP trade network (third column) and the arms trade network (fourth column).
lated ones (circles) for the bank network, the network of GDP trade and the arms trade
network. The comparison of observed and the simulated distributions shown in Figure
11 indicate that the model can relatively well reproduce the observed empirical net-
works, even though the model is parsimoniously parameterized in relying only on two
exogenous variables α and ζ. The fit seems to be best for the networks of banks, which
also shows the most distinct nestedness pattern (see Figure 10).
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Appendix
A. Proofs of Propositions, Corollaries and Lemmas
In this section we give the proofs of the propositions, corollaries and lemmas stated earlier
in the paper.
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 1. (i) A graph having a stepwise adjacency matrix is a nested split
graph G. A nested split graph has a nested neighborhood structure. The neighborhoodNj of an
agent j is contained in the neighborhood Ni of the next higher degree agent i with |Ni| = di >
|Nj| = dj with Nj ⊂ Ni. For the adjacency matrix A the vector of Bonacich centralities is given
by b(G,λ) = λAb+ u, with u = (1, . . . , 1)⊤. For agent i we then get
bi(G,λ) = 1+ λ
n
∑
k=1
aikbk(G,λ) = 1+ λ ∑
k∈Ni
bk(G,λ),
and similarly for agent j
bj(G,λ) = 1+ λ ∑
k∈Nj
bk(G,λ).
SinceNj ⊂ Ni and dj = |Nj| < |Ni| = di we get
bi(G,λ)
bj(G,λ)
=
1+ λ∑k∈Ni bk(G,λ)
1+ λ∑k∈Nj bk(G,λ)
> 1. (12)
The inequality follows from the fact that the Bonacich centrality is nonnegative and the numer-
ator contains the sum over the same positive numbers as the denominator plus some additional
values.
Conversely, in a nested split graph we must either haveNi ⊂ Nj orNj ⊂ Ni. Assuming that
bi(G,λ) > bj(G,λ) we can conclude from the above equation thatNj ⊂ Ni and therefore |Ni| =
di > |Nj| = dj. If there are l distinct degrees in G then the ordering of degrees d1 > d2 > . . . > dl
is equivalent to the ordering of the Bonacich centralities b1(G,λ) > b2(G,λ) > . . . > bl(G,λ).
(ii) Consider the agents i, j and k in the nested split graph G(t), such that dj ≤ dk. Let G
′
be the graph obtained from G(t) by adding the link (i, j) and G′′ be the graph obtained from
G(t) by adding the link (i, k). We want to show that the Bonacich centrality of agent i in G′′
is higher than in G′, that is, bi(G
′,λ) < bi(G
′′,λ). For this purpose we count the number of
walks emanating at agent iwhen connecting either to agent j or agent k. Since G is a nested split
graph, we have that Nj ⊂ Nk. An illustration is given in Figure A.1. We consider a walkWl of
length l ≥ 2 starting at agent i in G′. We want to know how many such walks there are in G′
and G′′, respectively. For this purpose we distinguish the following cases:
(a) Assume thatWl does not contain the link (i, j) nor the link (i, k). Then each such walkWl in
G′ is also contained in G′′, since G′ and G′′ differ only in the links (i, j) and (i, k).
(b) Consider the graph G′ and a walkWl starting at agent i and proceeding to agent j. For each
walkWl in G
′ there exists a walk W˜l in G
′′ being identical toWl except of proceeding from
i to j it proceeds from i to k and then to the neighbor of j that is visited after j inWl . This is
always possible since the neighbors of j are also neighbors of k.
(c) Consider a walk Wl in G
′ that starts at i but first takes a detour returning to i before pro-
ceeding from i to j. Using the same argument as in (ii) it follows that for each such walkWl
in G′ there exists a walk of the same length in G′′.
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Nj Nk
G′ G′′
Figure A.1: An illustration of the two networks G′ and G′′, which differ in the links (i, j) and (i, k). The
neighborhood Nj of agent j and the neighborhood Nk of agent k are indicated by corresponding boxes.
Note that the neighborhood of agent j is contained in the neighborhood of agent k. The loop at agent i
indicates a walk starting at i and coming back to i before proceeding to either agent j or k.
(d) Consider a walk Wl in G
′ that starts at agent i and at some point in its sequence of agents
and links proceeds from agent j to agent i. For each such walkWl in G
′ there exists a walk
W˜l in G
′′ that is identical toWl except that it does not proceed from a neighbor of j to j and
then to i it proceeds from a neighbor of j to k and then to i.
The above cases take into account all possible walks in G′ and G′′ of an arbitrary length l and
show that in G′′ there are at least as many walks of length l starting from agent i as there are in
G′.
Now consider the walks of length two,W2, in G
′ starting at agent i and proceeding to agent
j. Then there are |Nj| such walks in G
′. However, there are |Nk| > |Nj| such walks in G
′′ of
length two that start at agent i.
The Bonacich centrality bi(G(t),λ) is computed by the number of all walks in G(t) starting
from i, where the walks of length l are weighted by their geometrically decaying factor λl . We
have shown that for each l the number of walks in G′′ is larger or equal than the number of
walks in G′ and for l = 2 it is strictly larger. Thus, the Bonacich centrality of agent i in G′′ is
higher than in G′.
(iii) An analogous argument as for the creation of a link holds for the removal of a link for agent
i from j, k ∈ Ni with dk > dj. Since the number of walks starting from i is reduced more by
removing the link (i, k) than by removing the link (i, j) (there are at least as many walks from i
passing through k than there are through j), wemust have that bi(G⊖ (i, k),λ) < bi(G⊖ (i, j),λ).
Finally, note that all agents in a nested split graph are at most two links separated from each
other (if there exists any walk between them). Thus, the agent with the highest degree is also
the agent with the highest degree among the neighbors’ neighbors. From this discussionwe see
that in a nested split graph G(t) the best response of an agent i are the agents with the highest
degrees in i’s second-order neighborhood.
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 2. It has to be clear that this proof only holds for the unperturbed
dynamics when the noise vanishes, that is when ζ = 0. This is the case of the stochastically
stable states. As a result, we are making a claim about the stochastically stable states (ζ = 0),
but not the case of ζ > 0.
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A′ =


0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 0
1 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 1
1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0


←−−−−−
G⊕(4,10)
A =


0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 0
1 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 0
1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0


−−−−→
G⊕(4,7)
A′′ =


0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 0
1 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 0 0
1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0


Figure A.2: Two possible positions for the creation of a link from agent 4, either to agent 7 (right) or to
agent 10 (left), are indicated above. Agent 7 has degree 3 while agent 10 has degree 1. Creating a link to
an agent with higher degree results in higher equilibrium payoffs. Thus, the best response of agent 4 is
agent 7 and not agent 10.
Let us now start with the proof. We give a proof by induction. The induction basis is trivial.
We start at t = 0 from an empty network G(0) = K¯n, which has a trivial stepwise adjacency
matrix (see also the Definition 5). Since there are no links present in K¯n we can omit the removal
of a link. Consider a small time increment ∆t > 0. During that time interval a one step transition
with positive probability can only involve the creation of a link by an isolated agent. All other
isolated agents are best responses of this agent. The formation of the link creates a path of length
one whose adjacencymatrix is stepwise. This is true becausewe can always find a simultaneous
columns and rows permutation which makes the adjacency matrix stepwise. Thus G(∆t) has a
stepwise adjacency matrix.
Next we consider the induction step of a one step transition from G(t) to G(t+ ∆t). By the
induction hypothesis, G(t) is a nested split graph with a stepwise adjacency matrix. First, we
consider the creation of a link (i, j). Let agent j be a best response of agent i, that is j ∈ Bi(G(t)).
Using Proposition 1, this means that agent i must be the agent with the highest degree not
already connected to j. From the stepwise adjacency matrix A(G(t)) of G(t) (see Definition
5) we find that adding the link (i, j) to the network G(t) such that j has the highest degree
among all agents not already connected to i results in a matrix A(G(t)⊕ (i, j)) that is stepwise.
Therefore, the network G(t)⊕ (i, j) is a nested split graph.
We give an example in Figure A.2. Let the agents be numbered by the rows respectively
columns of the adjacency matrix. We assume that agent 4 receives a link creation opportunity.
Two possible positions for the creation of a link from agent 4, either to agent 7 or to agent 10
are indicated with boxes. Since, in a stepwise matrix, the agent in the best response set has the
highest degree, agent 7 is a best response of agent 4 while agent 10 is not. It further holds that
agent 4 is also a best response of agent 7, since agent 4 is the agent with the highest degree not
already connected to agent 7. Finally, we observe that creating the link 47 preserves the stepwise
form of the adjacency matrix (see also Definition 5).41
For the decay of a link a similar argument can be applied as in the preceding discussion.
Disconnecting from the agent with the smallest degree decreases the Bonacich centrality and
equilibrium payoffs the least, and hence, this will be the link that decays as ζ = 0. From the
properties of the stepwise matrixA(G(t)) it then follows that the matrixA(G(t)⊖ (i, j)) is step-
41The adjacency matrix is uniquely defined up to a permutation of its rows and columns. Applying
such a permutation, we can always find an adjacency matrix which is stepwise.
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wise.
Thus, at any time t ≥ 0 in the network formation process (G(t))t∈R+ , G(t) is a nested split
graph with an associated stepwise adjacency matrix A(G(t)). Let Ψ denote the set of nested
split graphs on n nodes. It can be shown that |Ψ| = 2n−1 [Mahadev and Peled, 1995]. We thus
have shown that for the unperturbed dynamics in the limit of vanishing mistakes (noise), when
ζ = 0, the network G(t) is a nested split graph almost surely, which is to say that P(G(t) ∈
Ψ|G(0) = K¯n) = 1 for all t ≥ 0.
PROOF OF COROLLARY 1. In Proposition 2 we have shown thatG(t) generated by (G(t))t∈R+ is
a nested split graph for all times t. In a nested split graph, any node in the connected component
is directly connected to the node(s) with maximum degree. Thus, there exists a path of at most
length two from any node to any other node in the connected component. It follows that G(t)
consists of a connected component and possible isolated nodes.
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 3. First, we show that (G(t))t∈R+ is a Markov chain. Since the transi-
tion rate qζ(G,G′) governing the transition from a network G to a network G′ depends only on
the current network G, the following Markov property holds
P
(
G(t+ s) = G′|G(s) = G, {G(u) : 0 ≤ u < s}
)
= P
(
G(t+ s) = G′|G(s) = G
)
,
for all t ≥ 0, s ≥ 0 and G,G′ ∈ Ω. The number of possible networks G(t) is finite for any
time t ≥ 0 and the transition rates depend on the state G(t) but not on the time t. Therefore,
(G(t))t∈R+ is a finite state, continuous time, homogeneous Markov chain. Further, note that the
transition rates are bounded.
Next, we show that the Markov chain is irreducible. Consider two networks G,G′ ∈ Ω.
(G(t))t∈R+ is irreducible if there exists a positive probability to pass from any G to any other G
′
in Ω. This means that there exists a sequence of networks G1,G2, . . . ,Gn with the property that
qζ(G,G1)q
ζ(G1,G2) · · · q
ζ(Gn,G′) 6= 0. We say that G′ is accessible from G. For ζ > 0 the logistic
function in the transition rates implies that such a sequence always exists and irreducibility
follows. We then have that a unique invariant distribution µζ exists.
Next, we consider the case of ζ = 0. Let Ψ be the set of nested split graphs and denote by
Ψ¯ = Ω\Ψ. In the following, we show that the networks in Ψ¯ are transient. Observe that for
any network G ∈ Ψ¯ and αi > 0 there exists a positive probability that in a finite number of
consecutive transitions in the Markov chain links are removed and no links are created until
the empty network K¯n ∈ Ω is reached. Let T < ∞ be the time when this happens starting
from G /∈ Ψ. Note that K¯n ∈ Ψ, and therefore Proposition 2 implies that all networks G(t),
t > T, visited by the chain will be in Ψ. A state G is transient if
∫ ∞
0 P(G(t + s) = G|G(t) =
G)ds < ∞ [see e.g. Grimmett and Stirzaker, 2001, Chap. 6]. We have that
∫ ∞
0 P(G(t + s) =
G|G(t) = G)ds = E
(∫ ∞
0 1G(G(s))ds|G(t) = G
)
≤ E(T) < ∞. Therefore, all networks which
are not nested split graphs are transient and they have vanishing probability in the stationary
distribution, i.e. µ(Ψ¯) = 0.
In the following, we show that the set Ψ is a communicating class. Similar to our previous
analysis, it holds that for any G ∈ Ψ and αi > 0 there exists a positive probability that in all
consecutive transitions in the Markov chain links are created and no links are removed until the
complete network Kn ∈ Ω is reached. Then for βi > 0 there exists a positive probability that
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from Kn only those links decay such that the network G
′ remains.42 Therefore, there exists a
positive probability to pass from any network G to any other network G′ with positive proba-
bility, as long as G,G′ ∈ Ψ. Similarly, one can show that G is accessible from G′. States G and G′
in Ψ are accessible from one-another. We say that they communicate and Ψ is a communicating
class.
Thus, in the case of ζ = 0, the state space Ω can be partitioned in a communicating class
Ψ and a set of transient states Ψ¯. The long run behavior of the chain is determined by the
states in recurrent class Ψ and we have a unique invariant distribution with µ(Ψ) = 1 [see e.g.
Ethier and Kurtz, 1986].
Before we proceed with the proof of Proposition 4, we introduce the sampled-time Markov
chain (G(t))t∈T , T ≡ {0,∆t, 2∆t, . . .}, associatedwith the continuous timeMarkov chain (G(t))t∈R+
in the limit of ζ = 0 on the same measure space (Ω,F) [see e.g. Gallager, 1996, Chap. 6]. In the
sampled-time Markov chain (G(t))t∈T transitions occur only at discrete times t ∈ T separated
by (small) increments of size ∆t. The transition probabilities of the sampled-timeMarkov chain
(G(t))t∈T are given by p(G,G
′) = P(G(t + ∆t) = G′|G(t) = G) = q(G,G′)∆t for G 6= G′
and p(G,G) = P(G(t + ∆t) = G|G(t) = G) = 1− q(G,G)∆t such that ∑G′∈Ω P(G(t+ ∆t) =
G′|G(t) = G) = 1. As the next lemma illustrates, both chains have the same long-run behavior.
Lemma 1. The continuous timeMarkov chain (G(t))t∈R+ and the sampled timeMarkov chain (G(t))t∈T ,
T ≡ {0,∆t, 2∆t, . . .}, ∆t ≥ 0, have the same stationary distribution µ on Ω.
PROOF OF LEMMA 1. To see this, consider a probability measure µ : Ω → [0, 1]. The stationary
distribution of the sampled-timeMarkov chain satisfies
µ(G) = ∑
G′∈Ω
p(G′,G)µ(G′) = ∑
G′ 6=G
q(G′,G)∆tµ(G′) + (1− q(G,G)∆t)µ(G),
which implies the system of equations determining the stationary distribution of the continuous
time Markov chain µ(G)q(G,G) = ∑G′ 6=G q(G
′,G)µ(G′), or equivalently µQ = 0.
Hence, in order to investigate the states in the support of the stationary distributionof (G(t))t∈R+ ,
it suffices to study the stationary distribution of the discrete time Markov chain (G(t))t∈T .
Moreover, note that in the limit of ∆t ↓ 0, also the sample paths of the two chains agree [see
e.g. Gallager, 1996, Chap. 6].
One can show that the sampled-time Markov chain on the nested split graphs Ψ (it is
enough to require that G(0) ∈ Ψ such that G(t) ∈ Ψ for all t > 0) is irreducible and aperi-
odic, and hence is ergodic. Moreover, it has a primitive transition matrix P defined by (P)ij =
P
(
G(t+ ∆t) = Gj|G(t) = Gi
)
for any Gi,Gj ∈ Ψ.
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 4. In the followingwe consider the sampled-timeMarkov chain (G(t))t∈T
with α ≡ αi = 1− βi for all i ∈ N. Due to Lemma 1, the stationary distribution of this chain is
equivalent to the continuous time Markov chain of Definition 2 as ζ converges to zero. More-
over, because of ergodicity from Proposition 3, we can assume w.l.o.g. that G(0) ∈ Ψ. It then
42From the adjacency matrix associated with the complete network there exists a sequence of stepwise
matrices in which a link to a neighbor with the smallest degree is removed such that any other stepwise
matrix can be obtained.
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follows that G(t) ∈ Ψ for all t > 0, and therefore, we restrict the state space Ω to the set of
nested split graphs Ψ.
At every step t ∈ T in the sampled-time Markov chain a link is created with probability α
and a link is removed with probability 1− α. Further, we consider the complementary chain
(G′(t))t∈T on the same state space Ω where in every period t a link is created with probability
α′ = 1 − α and a link is removed with probability 1 − α′ = α.43 This means that a link is
removed in G′(t) whenever a link is created in G(t) and a link is created in G′(t) whenever a
link is removed in G(t).
As an example, consider the network G represented by the adjacencymatrixA in Figure A.2.
The complement G¯ has an adjacency matrix A¯ obtained from A by replacing each one element
in A by zero and each zero element by one, except for the elements on the diagonal. Let H be
the network obtained from G by adding the link 47 (setting a47 = a74 = 1 inA). The probability
of this link being created and thus the probability of reaching H after the process was in G is
3α/n, either by selecting one of the two nodes with degrees three or the node with degree five
to create a link. Observe that this is identical to the probability of reaching the network H¯ from
G¯ if either the two nodes with degrees seven or the node with degree four in G¯ are selected to
remove a link (with probability α′ = 1− α).
In general we can say that, for any G1,G2 ∈ Ω we have that
P (G(t+ ∆t) = G2|G(t) = G1) = P
(
G′(t+ ∆t) = G¯2|G
′(t) = G¯1
)
. (13)
Next consider the stationary distributionµ of (G(t))t∈T and the corresponding transitionmatrix
P. Similarly, consider the stationary distribution µ′ of (G′(t))t∈T and the corresponding transi-
tion matrix P′. Further, consider an ordering of states G1,G2, . . . in Ω and the transition matrix
P with elements (P)ij giving the probability of observing Gj after the Markov chain (G(t))t∈T
was in Gi. Similarly, consider an ordering of states G¯1, G¯2, . . . in Ω and the transition matrix P
′
with elements (P′)ij giving the probability of observing G¯j after the Markov chain (G
′(t))t∈T
was in G¯i. Equation (13) implies that P = P
′. Moreover, for the stationary distributions it must
hold that µP = µ and µ′P′ = µ′. Since P is primitive, P has a unique positive eigenvector and
therefore µ′ = µ. It follows that for any network G ∈ Ω with probability µ(G) we can take the
complement G¯ = G′ and assign it the probability µ(G) to get the corresponding probability in
µ′, i.e. µ(G) = µ′(G′).
Before we proceed with the proof of Proposition 5, we state two useful lemmas.
Lemma 2. Consider the sampled-time Markov chain (G(t))t∈T , T ≡ {0,∆t, 2∆t, . . .}, ∆t ≡ 1/n,
with α ≡ αi = 1− βi for all i ∈ N , 0 < α ≤ 1/2, and restrict the state space Ω to the set Ψ of all
nested split graphs on n nodes. For any 0 ≤ d ≤ n − 1 let X denote the set of states in Ω in which
there is exactly one node with degree d + 1 and Y the set of states where there is no node with degree
d+ 1. Denote by µX the probability of the states in X in the stationary distribution µ of (G(t))t∈T and
43Two nodes of G′(t) are adjacent if and only if they are not adjacent in G(t). Note that the complement
of a nested split graph is a nested split graph as well [Mahadev and Peled, 1995]. In particular, the net-
works G′(t) are nested split graphs in which the number of nodes in the dominating subsets corresponds
to the number of nodes in the independent sets in G(t) and the number of nodes in the independent sets
in G′(t) corresponds to the number of nodes in the dominating subsets in G(t). Thus, (G′(t))t∈T has the
same state space Ω as (G(t))t∈T , namely the space Ψ consisting all unlabeled nested split graphs on n
nodes.
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by µY the probability of states in Y. If the number Nd of nodes with degree d in Y is Θ(n) such that
limn→∞ Nd/n > 0 then limn→∞ µY = 0.
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PROOF OF LEMMA 2. Let N(X,Y, y) be the expected number of times states in X occur before
the process reachesY (not counting the process as having immediately reachedY if y ∈ Y) when
the process starts in y. Then the following relation holds (see Theorem 6.2.3 in Kemeny and Snell
[1960] and also Ellison [2000])
µX
µY
= N(X,Y, y). (14)
Let pYX denote a lower bound on the probability that a state in X occurs after the process is in a
state in Y and, conversely, let pXY denote the probability that a state inY occurs after the process
is in a state in X. This probability is the same for all states in X, since from the properties of the
Markov chain (G(t))t∈T , it follows that pXY = 2(1− α)/n, because there exist two possibilities
to remove the link of the node with degree d + 1 and the probability to select a node for link
removal is (1− α)/n. Observe that this probability vanishes for large n, and limn→∞ pXY = 0.
Moreover, we have that
N(X,Y, y) ≥ pYXpXY + 2pYX(1− pXY)pXY + 3pYX(1− pXY)
2pXY + . . .
= pYXpXY
∞
∑
i=1
i(1− pXY)
i−1 =
pYX
pXY
.
The right hand side of the above inequality takes into account the fact that states in X can be
reached once, twice, etc., before a state in Y is reached and assigns the corresponding probabili-
ties to compute the expected value.
By assuming that there exists a number Nd of nodes with degree d which is Θ(n), we have
that pYX ≥ αNd/n and limn→∞ pYX > 0. It then follows that
µX
µY
= N(X,Y, y) ≥
pYX
pXY
=
α
2(1− α)
Nd → ∞ as n→ ∞. (15)
Since µX is a probability with µX ≤ 1, Equation (15) implies that limn→∞ µY = 0.
Lemma 3. Consider the sampled-time Markov chain (G(t))t∈T , T ≡ {0,∆t, 2∆t, . . .}, ∆t ≡ 1/n,
with α ≡ αi = 1− βi for all i ∈ N , and state space Ψ consisting of all nested split graphs on n nodes.
Then for 0 < α ≤ 1/2 the asymptotic expected proportion of isolated nodes in the limit of large n is given
by P(0) = 1−2α1−α .
PROOF OF LEMMA 3. We consider the expected change in the number of linksm(t) in G(t) from
t to t+ ∆t.45 The number of links increases by one if any node which does not have the maxi-
mumdegree n− 1 is selected for creating a link. This happenswith probability α (n− Nn−1(t)) /n.
The number of links decreases whenever a node with degree higher than zero is selected for
removing a link. This happens with probability (1− α) (n− N0(t)) /n. Putting the above con-
tributions together we can write for the expected change in the total number of links from t to
44By f = Θ(g) we mean that 0 < lim infn→∞
∣∣∣ f (n)g(n) ∣∣∣ ≤ lim supn→∞ ∣∣∣ f (n)g(n) ∣∣∣ < ∞. In particular, f = Θ(1)
implies that 0 < limn→∞ f (n) < ∞.
45We have that 2m(t) = ∑n−1d=0 Nd(t)d.
39
t+ ∆t
E (m(t+ ∆t)|N(t))−m(t) =
α
n
(n− Nn−1(t))−
1− α
n
(n− N0(t)) . (16)
Taking expectations on both sides of the above equation and denoting by P¯t(d) ≡ E (Nd(t)/n)
we obtain
E (m(t+ ∆t))−E (m(t)) = α (1− P¯t(n− 1))− (1− α) (1− P¯t(0)) . (17)
Let ρ denote the initial distribution of states, with ρi = 1 if Gi = K¯n and zero otherwise. Further,
letm be the column vector whose j-th coordinate,mj, is the number of links of network Gj ∈ Ω,
and let Gi = K¯n. Then we can write
E (m(t)) = E (m(t)|G(0) = Gi) = ∑
Gj∈Ω
P
(
G(t) = Gj|G(0) = Gi
)
mj = ∑
Gj∈Ω
(
P⊤
)
ij
mj
=
(
P⊤m
)
i
= ρP⊤m.
For large times t the expectation is computed over the invariant distribution µ. In particular,
limt→∞ ρP
⊤ = µ and therefore limt→∞ E (m(t)) = limt→∞ ρP⊤m = µm = limt→∞ E (m(t+ ∆t)).
Thus, we can set the left hand side of Equation (17) to zero, in the limit of large t, and obtain
a relationship between the asymptotic expected proportion of nodes of degree zero and one,
respectively,
1− 2α = (1− α)P¯(0)− αP¯(n− 1), (18)
where we have denoted by P¯(d) = limt→∞ P¯t(d). Next, we consider the chain (G′(t))t∈T which
is constructed from (G(t))t∈T by taking the complement of each network G(t) in every period
t (see also the proof of Proposition 4). In the following, denote the asymptotic expected number
of links, limt→∞ E (m(t)), of (G(t))t∈T by m¯ and of (G
′(t))t∈T by m¯
′. By construction, we must
have that m¯ = n(n− 1)/2− m¯′. From Proposition 4 we know that the Markov chain (G′(t))t∈T
has the same stationary distribution µ′ as the chain (G(t))t∈T for a link creation probability
of α′ = 1− α. For α = 1/2 the two processes are identical and we must have that also their
expected number of links are the same. This implies that for α = 1/2, m¯ = m¯′ = n(n − 1)/4.
The only nested split graph with this number of links, for which the complement has the same
number of links as the original graph, is the one in which each independent set is of size one
and also each dominating subset has size one (except possibly for the set corresponding to the(⌊
k
2
⌋
+ 1
)
-th partition). Thus, for α = 1/2 it must hold that P¯(0) = P¯(n− 1) = 1/n.
Moreover, we know that for α < 1/2 the expected number of maximally connected nodes
(with degree n− 1) is at most as large as the expected number for α = 1/2, since the probability
of links being created strictly decreases while the probability of links being removed increases
for values of α below 1/2 (and the probability of a maximally connected node losing a link
strictly increases). Thus P¯(n− 1) ≤ 1/n for α ≤ 1/2, and for large n we can write Equation (18)
as follows 1− 2α = (1− α)P¯(0). This is equivalent to
P¯(0) =
1− 2α
1− α
. (19)
For α = 0 no links are created and all nodes are isolated, that is P¯(0) = 1, while for α = 1/2 the
asymptotic expected number of isolated nodes vanishes in the limit of large n.
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Figure A.3: (Left) Representation of the stepwise matrix A of a nested split graph G and some selected
degree partitions. The stepfunction separating the zero entries in the matrix from the one entries is shown
with a thick line. (Right) Representation of the stepwise matrixA of a nested split graph G. The stepfunc-
tion separating the zero entries in the matrix from the one entries is shown with a thick line.
With these two lemmas in hand, let us now prove Proposition 5.
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 5. For the proof of the proposition it is enough to consider the sampled-
time Markov chain (G(t))t∈T with αi = 1− βi = α for all i ∈ N . Due to Lemma 1, it has the
same stationary distribution as the continuous time Markov chain of Definition 2 when ζ con-
verges to zero. Moreover, because of ergodicity from Proposition 3, we can assume w.l.o.g. that
G(0) ∈ Ψ and G(t) ∈ Ψ for all t > 0. We can then restrict the state space Ω to the nested
split graphs Ψ ⊂ Ω. We further assume w.l.o.g. that the step size is given by ∆t = 1/n, which
becomes arbitrarily small as n grows.
Note that G(t) is completely determined by N(t) and vice versa. Thus it follows that
{N(t)}t∈T is a Markov chain. Denote by P¯t(d) ≡ E (Nd(t)/n) the expected proportion of
nodes with degree d at time t and let us denote by P¯(d) = limn→∞ P¯t(d); P¯(d) is determined
by the invariant distribution µ in the limit of large times t. Lemma 3 shows that Equation (8)
holds for d = 0. In the following we show by induction that, given that Equation (8) holds for
P¯(d − 1) and P¯(d), as n becomes large, also P¯(d + 1) satisfies Equation (8) for all 0 ≤ d < d∗,
in the limit of large n. For this purpose we consider (a) the expected number of isolated
nodes E (N0(t+ ∆t)|N(t)) and (b) the expected number of nodes with degree d = 1, . . . , d
∗,
E (Nd(t+ ∆t)|N(t)) at time t+ ∆t, conditional on the current degree distributionN(t).
(a) Consider a particular network G(t) in period t generated by (G(t))t∈R+ and its associated
degree distribution N(t). Figure A.3 (left) shows an illustration of the corresponding step-
wise matrix. In the following we compute the expected change of the number N0(t) of
isolated nodes in G(t).
The expected change of N0(t) due to the creation of a link has the following contributions.
An agent with the highest degree k in Nk(t) can create a link to an isolated agent and thus
decreases the number of isolated agents by one. The expected change from this link is
−αNk(t)/n . On the other hand, if an isolated agent creates a link then the expected change
in the number of isolated agents is −αN0(t)/n.
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Moreover, the removal of links can affect N0(t) if there is only one agent with maximal
degree, i.e. Nk(t) = 1. In this case, if the agent with the highest degree removes a link,
then an additional isolated agent is created yielding an expected increase in N0(t) of (1−
α)Nk(t)/n. Next, if an agent with degree one in N1(t) removes a link, then the number of
isolated agents increases. Note that in a nested split graph N1(t) > 0 implies that Nk(t) = 1
and vice versa. This gives an expected change of N0(t) given by (1− α)N1(t)/n.
Putting the above contributions together, the expected change in the number of isolated
nodes at time t+ ∆t, conditional on N(t), is given by the following expression46
E (N0(t+ ∆t)|N(t))− N0(t) = −
α
n
(N0(t) + Nk(t)) +
1− α
n
(N1(t) + 1) δNk(t),1. (20)
We can take expectations on both sides of Equation (20). For large times t the expectation is
computed on the basis of the invariant distribution µ and similarly to the proof of Lemma
3, after taking expectations, we can set the left hand side of Equation (20) to zero for large
times t. Note that from Lemma 3 we know that the asymptotic expected proportion P¯(0)
of isolated nodes is Θ(1), for n large. Thus we can apply the result of Lemma 2 which tells
us that the networks in which there does not exist a node with degree one have vanishing
probability in µ for large n. Since the existence of a node with degree one implies that
Nk(t) = 1, in the limit of large n we can set δNk(t),1 = 1. We then obtain from Equation (20)
P¯(1) =
α
1− α
P¯(0). (21)
This shows that also P¯(1) satisfies Equation (8). Together with Lemma 3 this proves the
induction basis.
(b) We give a proof by induction on the number Nd(t) of nodes with degree 0 < d < d
∗ in a
network G(t) in the support of the stationary distribution µ. In the following, we compute
the expected change in Nd(t) due to the creation or the removal of a link. An illustration
can be found in Figure A.3 (right).
Let us investigate the creation of a link. With probability α/n a link is created from an agent
in Nk−d(t) to an agent in Nd(t). This yields a contribution to the expected change of Nd(t)
of −αNk−d(t)/n. If a link is created from an agent in Nk−d+1(t) to an agent in Nd(t) then
the expected change is α/n, if Nk−d+1(t) contains only a single agent. Similarly, if a link is
created from an agent in Nd−1(t) to an agent in Nd(t) then the expected change of Nd(t) is
αNd−1(t)/n, if Nk−d+1(t) = 1. Moreover, if an agent in Nd(t) is selected for link creation
then we get an expected decrease of −αNd(t)/n.
Now we consider the removal of a link. If a link is removed from the agent in Nk−d+1(t)
to an agent in Nd(t) then the expected change of Nd(t) is −(1− α)Nk−d+1(t)/n. If a link is
removed from an agent in Nk−d(t) to an agent in Nd+1(t) then the expected increase of Nd(t)
is (1− α)/n, if Nk−d(t) = 1. Moreover, if an agent in Nd+1(t) is selected for removing a link,
then we get an expected increase of (1− α)Ni+d(t)/n, if Nk−d(t) = 1. Finally, if an agent in
Nd(t) is selected for removing a link, then we get an expected change of −(1− α)Nd(t)/n.
46δi,j denotes the usual Kronecker delta which is 1 if i = j and 0 otherwise.
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Putting the above contributions together, the expected change in Nd(t) is given by
E (Nd(t+ ∆t)|N(t)) − Nd(t) =
α
n
(
−Nd(t) + (Nd−1(t) + 1) δNk−d+1(t),1 − Nk−d(t)
)
+
1− α
n
(
−Nd(t) + (Nd+1(t) + 1) δNk−d(t),1 − Nk−d+1(t)
)
.
(22)
We can take expectations on both sides of Equation (22) and similarly to part (a) of this
proof we can set the left-hand-side of Equation (22) as t becomes large. For large times
t the above expectation is computed on the basis of the invariant distribution µ. By the
induction assumption, the asymptotic expected proportion P¯(d − 1) of nodes with degree
d − 1 is Θ(1) in the limit of large n (as follows from Equation (8)). Thus we can apply
Lemma 2 and neglect the networks in which there does not exist a node with degree d since
they have vanishing probability in µ for large n. Similarly, we know from the induction
assumption that the asymptotic proportion P¯(d) of nodes with degree d is Θ(1) and, by
virtue of Lemma 2, we know that the networks in which there does not exist a node with
degree d+ 1 have vanishing probability in µ for large n. Thus, in the limit of large n we can
set δNk−d+1(t),1 = δNk−d(t),1 = 1, since the existence of nodes with degrees d and d+ 1 implies
that Nk−d+1(t) = Nk−d(t) = 1 in the limit of large t and n. Therefore, we get from Equation
(22) the following relationship
P¯(d+ 1) =
1
1− α
P¯(d)−
α
1− α
P¯(d− 1). (23)
Inserting the expressions for P¯(d− 1) and P¯(d) from Equation (8) into Equation (23) yields
P¯(d+ 1) =
1
1− α
1− 2α
1− α
(
α
1− α
)d
−
α
1− α
1− 2α
1− α
(
α
1− α
)d−1
=
1− 2α
1− α
(
α
1− α
)d+1
Thus, Equation (8) also holds for P¯(d+ 1). This proves the induction step.
Finally, we have that the degree distribution must be normalized to one, i.e. ∑n−1d=0 P¯(d) = 1.
We know that the number of agents in the dominating subsets with degrees larger than d∗ is d∗
(since each set contains only one node and there are d∗ such sets).47 Adding this to the number
of agents in the independent sets with degree d = 0, . . . , d∗ yields n∑d
∗
d=0 P¯(d)+ d
∗ = n. Further,
inserting Equation (8) we can derive the number d∗ of independent sets as a function of n and α
d∗(n, α) =
ln
(
2(1−α)
(1−2α)n
)
ln
(
α
1−α
) . (24)
d∗ is a monotonic decreasing function of n for a fixed value of α. Conversely, for a fixed value
of n we get the limits limα→0 d
∗ = 0 and limα→1/2 d
∗ = n/2.
We finish the proof with the following observation, showing that the empirical degree dis-
tribution concentrates around its expected value in the limit of large n when ∆t = 1/n. More
47Note that since networks in which there does not exist a node with degree 0 ≤ d ≤ d∗ in the corre-
sponding independent set can be neglected, the structure of nested split graphs implies that all dominat-
ing subsets have size one.
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precisely, for any ε > 0 we have that P (|Pt(d)−E (Pt(d))| ≥ ε) ≤ 2e
− ε
2n2∆t
8t . To see this, let us
define the following random variable Yd(s) ≡ E (Nd(t)|N(s)), s ∈ T . Since {N(t), t ∈ T } is a
Markov chain, the sequence {Yd(s), s ∈ T , s ≤ t} is aMartingalewith respect to {N(t), t ∈ T }.
48
Moreover, the change in the number of nodes with degree d per period t is bounded by two, i.e.
|Nd(t)− Nd(t− ∆t)| ≤ 2, since at most one link is added or removed in every period t and this
can change the degrees of at most two nodes. Therefore, we can apply Hoeffding’s inequality
(see e.g. Theorem 3, Section 12.2 in Grimmett and Stirzaker [2001]), which states that for any
0 < s ≤ t with |Y(s) − Y(s − ∆t)| ≤ c and any ε > 0, P (|Y(t)−Y(0)| > ε) ≤ 2e
− ε
2∆t
2tc2 . With
c = 2, Y(t) = E (Nd(t)|N(t)) = Nd(t), Y(0) = E (Nd(t)|N(0)) = E (Nd(t)) and ∆t = 1/n it
then follows that
P
(∣∣∣∣Nd(t)n −E
(
Nd(t)
n
)∣∣∣∣ ≥ ε
)
= P (|Nd(t)−E (Nd(t))| ≥ nε) ≤ 2e
− ε
2n2∆t
8t = 2e−
ε2n
8t → 0,
(25)
as n→ ∞. This implies that the empirical proportion Nd(t)/n of nodes with degree d converges
in probability to its expected value E (Nd(t)/n), as n becomes large.
Since (Ω,F ,P) is a discrete probability space, this also implies convergence almost surely.
To see this, letAn ≡
{
G ∈ Ω :
∣∣∣Nd(t)n −E (Nd(t)n )∣∣∣ ≥ ε}. By Equation (25) we have that limn→∞ Pt(An) =
0. Then there exists and n0 ∈ N such that Pt(An) < Pt(G) for all G ∈ Ω with Pt(G) > 0 and
n > n0. Hence, for all n > n0 we have that {G ∈ Ω : Pt(G) > 0} /∈ An, {G ∈ Ω : Pt(G) >
0} ∩ An = ∅ and therefore Pt (
⋂∞
n=1
⋃∞
m=nAm) = 0.
PROOF OF COROLLARY 2. The results follows directly from the functional form of d∗(n, α) in
Proposition 5.
PROOF OF COROLLARY 3. See Theorem 1.2.4 in Mahadev and Peled [1995].
48We have that E (Yd(s)|N(s− ∆t)) = E (E (Nd(t)|N(s)) |N(s− ∆t)) = E (Nd(t)|N(s− ∆t)) = Yd(s−
∆t). Further, one can show that the first and second moments of {Yd(s), s ≤ t} are bounded. Thus,
{Yd(s), s ≤ t} is a Martingale with respect to {N(t)} for s, t ∈ T [see e.g. Grimmett and Stirzaker, 2001,
Chap. 12].
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B. Network Definitions and Characterizations (Supplementary Material)
A network (graph)G is the pair (N , E) consisting of a set of nodes (vertices)N = {1, . . . , n} and
a set of edges (links) E ⊂ N ×N between them. A link (i, j) is incident with nodes i and j. The
neighborhood of a node i ∈ N is the set Ni = {j ∈ N : (i, j) ∈ E}. The degree di of a node i ∈ N
gives the number of links incident to node i. Clearly, di = |Ni|. LetN
(2)
i =
⋃
j∈Ni Nj\ (Ni ∪ {i})
denote the second-order neighbors of node i. Similarly, the k-th order neighborhood of node i is
defined recursively fromN
(0)
i = {i},N
(1)
i = Ni andN
(k)
i =
⋃
j∈N
(k−1)
i
Nj\
(⋃k−1
l=0 N
(l)
i
)
. A walk
in G of length k from i to j is a sequence 〈i0, i1, . . . , ik〉 of nodes such that i0 = i, ik = j, ip 6= ip+1,
and ip and ip+1 are (directly) linked, that is ipip+1 ∈ E , for all 0 ≤ p ≤ k− 1. Nodes i and j are
said to be indirectly linked in G if there exists a walk from i to j in G containing nodes other than i
and j. A pair of nodes i and j is connected if they are either directly or indirectly linked. A node
i ∈ N is isolated in G if Ni = ∅. The network G is said to be empty (denoted by K¯n) when all its
nodes are isolated.
A subgraph, G′, of G is the graph of subsets of the nodes,N (G′) ⊆ N (G), and links, E(G′) ⊆
E(G). A graph G is connected, if there is a path connecting every pair of nodes. Otherwise
G is disconnected. The components of a graph G are the maximally connected subgraphs. A
component is said to be minimally connected if the removal of any link makes the component
disconnected.
A dominating set for a graph G = (N , E) is a subset S of N such that every node not in
S is connected to at least one member of S by a link. An independent set is a set of nodes in a
graph in which no two nodes are adjacent. For example the central node in a star K1,n−1 forms
a dominating set while the peripheral nodes form an independent set.
In a complete graph Kn, every node is adjacent to every other node. The graph in which no
pair of nodes is adjacent is the empty graph K¯n. A clique Kn′ , n
′ ≤ n, is a complete subgraph
of the network G. A graph is k-regular if every node i has the same number of links di = k for
all i ∈ N . The complete graph Kn is (n − 1)-regular. The cycle Cn is 2-regular. In a bipartite
graph there exists a partition of the nodes in two disjoint sets V1 and V2 such that each link
connects a node in V1 to a node in V2. V1 and V2 are independent sets with cardinalities n1 and
n2, respectively. In a complete bipartite graph Kn1,n2 each node in V1 is connected to each other
node in V2. The star K1,n−1 is a complete bipartite graph in which n1 = 1 and n2 = n− 1.
The complement of a graph G is a graph G¯ with the same nodes as G such that any two nodes
of G¯ are adjacent if and only if they are not adjacent in G. For example the complement of the
complete graph Kn is the empty graph K¯n.
Let A be the symmetric n × n adjacency matrix of the network G. The element aij ∈ {0, 1}
indicates if there exists a link between nodes i and j such that aij = 1 if (i, j) ∈ E and aij = 0
if (i, j) /∈ E . The k-th power of the adjacency matrix is related to walks of length k in the
graph. In particular,
(
Ak
)
ij
gives the number of walks of length k from node i to node j. The
eigenvalues of the adjacency matrix A are the numbers λ1,λ2, . . . ,λn such that Avi = λivi has
a nonzero solution vector vi, which is an eigenvector associated with λi for i = 1, . . . , n. Since
the adjacency matrix A of an undirected graph G is real and symmetric, the eigenvalues of
A are real, λi ∈ R for all i = 1, . . . , n. Moreover, if vi and vj are eigenvectors for different
eigenvalues, λi 6= λj, then vi and vj are orthogonal, i.e. v
⊤
i vj = 0 if i 6= j. In particular, R
n has
an orthonormal basis consisting of eigenvectors of A. Since A is a real symmetric matrix, there
exists an orthogonal matrix S such that S⊤S = SS⊤ = I (that is S⊤ = S−1) and S⊤AS = D,
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whereD is the diagonal matrix of eigenvalues of A and the columns of S are the corresponding
eigenvectors. The Perron-Frobenius eigenvalue λPF(G) is the largest real eigenvalue of A associated
with G, i.e. all eigenvalues λi of A satisfy |λi| ≤ λPF(G) for i = 1, . . . , n and there exists an
associated nonnegative eigenvector vPF ≥ 0 such that AvPF = λPF(G)vPF. For a connected
graph G the adjacency matrix A has a unique largest real eigenvalue λPF(G) and a positive
associated eigenvector vPF > 0. There exists a relation between the number of walks in a graph
and its eigenvalues. The number of closedwalks of length k from a node i in G to herself is given
by
(
Ak
)
ii
and the total number of closed walks of length k in G is tr
(
Ak
)
= ∑ni=1
(
Ak
)
ii
=
∑
n
i=1 λ
k
i . We further have that tr (A) = 0, tr
(
A2
)
gives twice the number of links in G and
tr
(
A3
)
gives six times the number of triangles in G.
C. Topological Properties of Nested Split Graphs (Supplementary Material)
In this supplementary appendix we discuss in more detail the topological properties of
nested split graphs that arise from our network formation process. We first derive several net-
work statistics for nested split graphs. We compute the degree distribution, the clustering co-
efficient, average nearest neighbor neighbor connectivity and the characteristic path length in a
nested split graph. In particular, we show that connected nested split graphs have small char-
acteristic path length, which is at most two. We then analyze different measures of centrality in
a nested split graph.49 From the expressions of these centrality measures we then can show that
degree, closeness, eigenvector and Bonacich centrality induce the same ordering of nodes in a
nested split graph. If the ordering is not strict, then this holds also for betweenness centrality.
Finally, for all statistics derived in this section we show that they are all completely determined
by the degree partition in a nested split graph.
C.1. Network Statistics
In the following sections we will compute the degree connectivity, the clustering coeffi-
cient, assortativity and average nearest nearest neighbor connectivity and the characteristic path
length in a nested split graph G as a function of the degree partitionD (introduced in Definition
3).
C.1.1. Degree Connectivity
The nested neighborhood structure of a nested split graph allows us to compute the degrees
of the nodes according to a recursive equation that is stated in the next corollary.
Corollary 3. Consider a nested split graph G = (N , E) and let D = (D0,D1, . . . ,Dk) be the degree
partition of G. Then du = 0 if u ∈ D0 and for each u ∈ Di, v ∈ Di−1, i = 1, . . . , k, we get
du =

dv + |Dk−i+1|, if i 6=
⌊
k
2
⌋
+ 1,
dv + |Dk−i+1| − 1, if i =
⌊
k
2
⌋
+ 1,
(26)
or equivalently
du =

∑
i
j=1 |Dk+1−j|, if 1 ≤ i ≤
⌊
k
2
⌋
,
∑
i
j=1 |Dk+1−j| − 1, if
⌊
k
2
⌋
+ 1 ≤ i ≤ k.
(27)
49See Wasserman and Faust [1994, Chap. 5.2] for an overview of different measures of centrality.
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Figure 1: Representation of nested split graphs and their degree partitions D with corresponding adja-
cency matrices A. A line between Di and Dj indicates that every node in Di is adjacent to every node in
Dj. The partitions included in the solid frame (Di with
⌊
k
2
⌋
+ 1 ≤ i ≤ k) are the dominating subsets while
the partitions in the dashed frame (Di with 1 ≤ i ≤
⌊
k
2
⌋
) are the independent sets. The figure on the left
considers the case of k = 6 (even) and the figure on the right the case of k = 7 (odd). The illustration
follows Mahadev and Peled [1995, p. 11].
Equation (26) shows that the neighborhoods of the agents in a nested split graph are nested
(see also Definition 4). The degrees of the agents in ascending order of the graph in Figure 1,
left, are 2, 3, 4, 5, 7, 9 while in the graph in Figure 1, right, they are 1, 2, 3, 4, 7, 8, 9.
C.1.2. Clustering Coefficient
The clustering coefficient C(u) for an agent u is the proportion of links between the agents
within her neighborhood Nu divided by the number of links that could possibly exist between
them [Watts and Strogatz, 1998]. It is given by
C(u) ≡
|{vw : v,w ∈ Nu ∧ vw ∈ E}|
du(du − 1)/2
. (28)
In a nested split graph the clustering coefficient can be derived from the degree partition, as the
following corollary shows.
Corollary 4. Consider a nested split graph G = (N , E) and let D = (D0,D1, . . . ,Dk) be the degree
partition of G. Denote by SiD = ∑
k
j=i |Dj|. Then for each u ∈ Di, i = 0, . . . , k, and du ≥ 2, the
clustering coefficient is given by
C(u) =


0, if i = 0,
1, if 1 ≤ i ≤
⌊
k
2
⌋
,
1
du(du−1)
(
S
⌊ k2⌋+1
D − 1
)[(
S
⌊ k2⌋+1
D − 2
)
+ 2|D⌊ k2⌋
|
]
, if i =
⌊
k
2
⌋
+ 1, k even,
1
du(du−1)
(
S
⌊ k2⌋+1
D − 1
)(
S
⌊ k2⌋+1
D − 2
)
, if i =
⌊
k
2
⌋
+ 1, k odd,
1
du(du−1)
[(
S
⌊ k2⌋+1
D − 1
)(
S
⌊ k2⌋+1
D − 2
)
+
2∑
⌊ k2⌋
j=k−i+1 |Dj|
(
S
k−j+1
D − 1
)]
, if
⌊
k
2
⌋
+ 2 < i ≤ k,
(29)
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where du is given by Equation (27).
PROOF OF COROLLARY 4. Note that for all agents in the independent sets, u ∈ Di with 1 ≤ i ≤⌊
k
2
⌋
, the clustering coefficient is one, since their neighbors are all connected among each other.
Next, we consider the agents u ∈ Di with
⌊
k
2
⌋
+ 1 ≤ i ≤ k and degree du = ∑
i
j=1 |Dk+1−j| −
1. The neighbors of agent u in the dominating subsets are all connected among each other
with a total of 12
(
∑
k
j=⌊ k2⌋+1
|Dj| − 1
)(
∑
k
j=⌊ k2⌋+1
|Dj| − 2
)
links, excluding agent u from the
dominating subset. The neighbors of u in the independent sets are not connected. Finally, we
consider the links between neighbors for which one neighbor is in a dominating subset and one
neighbor is in an independent set. If k is even we get ∑
⌊ k2⌋
j=k−i+1 |Dj|
(
∑
k
l=k−j+1 |Dl | − 1
)
links,
excluding agent u in the dominating subset (see Figure 1 (left)). If k is odd there is no such
contribution for the agents in the set D⌊ k2⌋+1
(see Figure 1 (right)). Putting these contributions
together we obtain the clustering coefficient of an agent u ∈ Di for all i = 1, . . . , k, as given by
Equation (29).
The total clustering coefficient is the average of the clustering coefficients over all agents,
C ≡ 1n ∑u∈N C(u). The clustering coefficients of the agents in ascending order of the graph in
Figure 1, left, are 5/12, 5/12, 13/21, 9/10, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, with a total clustering coefficient of C =
0.84. In the graph in Figure 1, right, it is 13/36, 13/28, 4/7, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, with a total clustering
of C = 0.74.
C.1.3. Assortativity and Nearest Neighbor Connectivity
There exists ameasure of degree correlation called average nearest neighbor connectivity [Pastor-Satorras et al.
2001]. More precisely, the average nearest neighbor connectivity dnn(u) is the average degree of
the neighbors of an agent with degree du. It is defined by
dnn(u) ≡
1
du
∑
v∈Nu
dv. (30)
In a nested split graph the average nearest neighbor connectivity is determined by its degree
partition.
Corollary 5. Consider a nested split graph G = (N , E) and let D = (D0,D1, . . . ,Dk) be the degree
partition of G. Denote by SiD = ∑
i
j=1 |Dk+1−j|. Then for each u ∈ Di, i = 0, . . . , k,
dnn(u) =


0, if i = 0,
1
SiD
∑
i
j=1 |Dk+1−j|
(
S
k+1−j
D − 1
)
, if i = 1, . . . ,
⌊
k
2
⌋
,
1
S
⌊ k2⌋+1
D −1
[
∑
k
j=⌊ k2⌋+2
|Dj|
(
S
j
D − 1
)
+
(
|D⌊ k2⌋+1
| − 1
)(
S
⌊ k2⌋+1
D − 1
)
+ |D⌊ k2⌋
|S
⌊ k2⌋
D
]
, if i =
⌊
k
2
⌋
+ 1, k even,
1
S
⌊ k2⌋+1
D −1
[
∑
k
j=⌊ k2⌋+1
|Dj|
(
S
j
D − 1
)]
− 1, if i =
⌊
k
2
⌋
+ 1, k odd,
1
SiD−1
[
∑
k
j=⌊ k2⌋+1
|Dj|
(
S
j
D − 1
)
+∑
⌊ k2⌋
j=k−i+1 |Dj|S
j
D
]
− 1, if i =
⌊
k
2
⌋
+ 2, . . . , k
(31)
48
PROOF OF COROLLARY 5. First, consider an agent u ∈ Di with i = 1, . . . ,
⌊
k
2
⌋
corresponding to
the independent sets. We know that the number of neighbors (degree) of agent u is given by
∑
i
j=1 |Dk+1−j|. The neighbors of agent u are the agents in the dominating subsets with degrees
given in Equation (27). Thus, the number of neighbors of the neighbors of u in the sets Dk+1−j
is ∑
k+1−j
l=1 |Dk+1−l | − 1. Putting the above results together, we obtain for the average nearest
neighbor connectivity of agent u ∈ Di, i = 1, . . . ,
⌊
k
2
⌋
, the following expression.
dnn(u) =
1
∑
i
j=1 |Dk+1−j|
i
∑
j=1
|Dk+1−j|
(
k+1−j
∑
l=1
|Dk+1−l | − 1
)
. (32)
Next, we consider an agent u in the set Di with
⌊
k
2
⌋
+ 2 ≤ i ≤ k corresponding to the domi-
nating subsets. The number of neighbors of agent u is given by ∑ij=1 |Dk+1−j| − 1. The num-
ber of neighbors of an agent v ∈ Dj,
⌊
k
2
⌋
+ 1 ≤ j ≤ k in the dominating subsets is given
by ∑
j
l=1 |Dk+1−l | − 1. Since agent u is connected to all other agents in the dominating sub-
sets, we can sum over all their neighborhoods with a total of ∑k
j=⌊ k2⌋+1
|Dj|
(
∑
j
l=1 |Dk+1−l | − 1
)
neighbors. Note however, that we have to subtract agent u herself from this sum. Morover,
the number of neighbors of an agent w ∈ Dj, 1 ≤ j ≤
⌊
k
2
⌋
in the independent sets is given by
∑
j
l=1 |Dk+1−l |. Thus, the average nearest neighbor connectivity of agent u ∈ Di,
⌊
k
2
⌋
+ 2 ≤ i ≤ k,
is given by
dnn(u) =
1
∑
i
j=1 |Dk+1−j|−1
[
∑
k
j=⌊ k2⌋+1
|Dj|
(
∑
j
l=1 |Dk+1−l | − 1
)
+ ∑
⌊ k2⌋
j=k−i+1 |Dj|∑
j
l=1 |Dk+1−l |
]
− 1.
(33)
In a similar way we can consider the cases i =
⌊
k
2
⌋
+ 1 for both k even and k odd.
When the average nearest neighbor connectivity is a monotonic increasing function of the
degree d, then the network is assortative, while, if it is monotonic decreasing with d, it is dissor-
tative [Newman, 2002; Pastor-Satorras et al., 2001]. Nested split graphs are dissortative, since
for i < j and du ∈ Di < dv ∈ Dj it follows that dnn(u) > dnn(v). This is because the higher
is the degree of an agent in a dominating subset, the more neighbors she has from the inde-
pendent sets with low degrees, which decreases her average nearest neighbor connectivity. For
example, the average nearest neighbor connectivities of the agents in the graph in Figure 1, left,
in ascending order are 13/3, 13/3, 37/7, 33/5, 15/2, 15/2, 25/3, 25/3, 9, 9 while in the graph in
Figure 1, right, they are 35/9, 35/8, 34/7, 7, 7, 8, 8, 8, 17/2, 9.
C.1.4. Characteristic Path Length
The characteristic path length is defined as the number of links in the shortest path between
two agents, averaged over all pairs of agents [Watts and Strogatz, 1998]. This can be written as
ℓ(G) ≡
1
n(n− 1)/2 ∑
u 6=v∈G
d(u, v), (34)
49
where d(u, v) is the geodesic (shortest path) between agent u and agent v in N\D0.
50 Then the
characteristic path length in a nested split graph is given by the following corollary.
Corollary 6. Consider a nested split graph G = (N , E) and let D = (D0,D1, . . . ,Dk) be the degree
partition of G. Then the characteristic path length of G is given by
ℓ(G) = 1
n(n−1)/2
[
1
2 ∑
k
j=⌊ k2⌋+1
|Dj|
(
∑
k
j=⌊ k2⌋+1
|Dj| − 1
)
+ ∑
⌊ k2⌋
j=1 |Dj|
(
∑
⌊ k2⌋
j=1 |Dj| − 1
)
+∑
⌊ k2⌋
l=1 |Dl |
(
∑
k
j=k−l+1 |Dj|+ 2∑
k−l
j=⌊ k2⌋+1
|Dj|
)]
.
(35)
PROOF OF COROLLARY 6. We first consider all pairs of agents in the dominating subsets. All
theses agents are adjacent to each other and thus the shortest path between them has length
one. Moreover, there are 12 ∑
k
j=⌊ k2⌋+1
|Dj|
(
∑
k
j=⌊ k2⌋+1
|Dj| − 1
)
pairs of agents in the dominating
subsets.
Next, we consider all pairs of agents in the independent sets. From Equation (40) we know
that all of them are at a distance of two links separated from each other. Moreover, there are
1
2 ∑
⌊ k2⌋
j=1 |Dj|
(
∑
⌊ k2⌋
j=1 |Dj| − 1
)
pairs of agents in which both agents stem from an independent
set.
Further, consider the pairs of agents in which one agent is in the independent set D1 and
the other in a dominating subset. Then there are |D1||Dk | pairs of agents with shortest path
1 and |D1|∑
k−1
j=⌊ k2⌋+1
|Dj| pairs of agents with shortest path 2. Similarly, we can consider the
pairs in which one agent is in the setD2. Then we have |D2|(|Dk |+ |Dk−1|) pairs of agents with
shortest path 1 and |D2|∑
k−2
j=⌊ k2⌋+1
|Dj| pairs of agents with shortest path 2. Finally, if one agent
is in the set D⌊ k2⌋
then we have |D⌊ k2⌋
|∑k
j=⌊ k2⌋+1
|Dj| pairs of agents with distance 1 and none
with distance 2, if k is even (see Figure 1, left). If k is odd (see Figure 1, right), and we have one
agent is in the set D⌊ k2⌋
then we have |D⌊ k2⌋
|∑k
j=⌊ k2⌋+2
|Dj| pairs of agents with distance 1 and
|D⌊ k2⌋
||D⌊ k2⌋+1
| pairs with distance 2.
Therefore, the average path length ℓ(G) defined in Equation (34) is given by the following
equation
n(n−1)
2 ℓ(G) =
1
2 ∑
k
j=⌊ k2⌋+1
|Dj|
(
∑
k
j=⌊ k2⌋+1
|Dj| − 1
)
+ 212 ∑
⌊ k2⌋
j=1 |Dj|
(
∑
⌊ k2⌋
j=1 |Dj| − 1
)
+∑
⌊ k2⌋
l=1 |Dl |
[
∑
k
j=k−l+1 |Dj|+ 2∑
k−l
j=⌊ k2⌋+1
|Dj|
]
.
(36)
Considering the graph in Figure 1, left, the characteristic path length is ℓ(G) = 22/15 while
in the graph in Figure 1, right, we get ℓ(G) = 68/45.
Note that, by taking the inverse of the shortest path length one can introduce a related mea-
surement, the network efficiency,51 ǫ(G) ≡ 1
n(n−1) ∑u 6=v∈G
1
d(u,v)
that is also applicable to discon-
50Note that we do not consider the isolated agents in the set D0 because the characteristic path length
ℓ(G) is not defined for disconnected networks G.
51 The network efficiency must not be confused with the efficiency of a network. The first is related to
short paths in the network while the latter measures social welfare, that is, the efficient network maxi-
50
nected networks. Finally, we find that in a connected nested split graph agents are at most two
links separated from each other and thus these graphs are characterized by a short characteristic
path length.
C.2. Centrality
In the next sections we analyze different measures of centrality in a nested split graph G.
We derive the expressions for degree, closeness and betweenness centrality as a function of the
degree partition of G. Finally, we show that these measures are similar in the sense that they
induce the same ordering of the nodes in G based on their centrality values.
C.2.1. Degree Centrality
The degree centrality of an agent u ∈ N is given by the proportion of agents that are ad-
jacent to u [Wasserman and Faust, 1994]. We obtain the normalized degree centrality simply
by dividing the degree of agent u with the maximum degree n − 1. This yields the following
corollary.
Corollary 7. Consider a nested split graph G = (N , E) and let D = (D0,D1, . . . ,Dk) be the degree
partition of G. Then for each u ∈ Di, i = 0, . . . , k, the degree centrality is given by
Cd(u) =


1
n−1 ∑
i
j=1 |Dk+1−j|, if 1 ≤ i ≤
⌊
k
2
⌋
,
1
n−1
(
∑
i
j=1 |Dk+1−j| − 1
)
, if
⌊
k
2
⌋
+ 1 ≤ i ≤ k.
(37)
PROOF OF COROLLARY 7. The result follows directly from Corollary 3.
We observe that degree centrality as well as the degree are increasing with increasing index
i of the set Di to which agent u belongs. Degree centralities for the graphs shown in Figure 1
can be derived from the degrees given in Section C.1.1 by dividing the degrees with n− 1.
C.2.2. Closeness Centrality
Excluding the isolated nodes in G, closeness centrality of agent u ∈ N \ D0 is defined as:
Cc(u) =
n− 1
∑v 6=u∈G d(u, v)
. (38)
where d(u, v) measures the shortest path between agent u and agent v in N \ D0. For a nested
split graph we obtain the following corollary.
Corollary 8. Consider a nested split graph G = (N , E) and let D = (D0,D1, . . . ,Dk) be the degree
partition of G. Then for each u ∈ Di, i = 0, . . . , k, the closeness centrality is given by
Cc(u) =


n−1
∑
k
j=k−i+1 |Dj|+2∑
k−i
j=1 |Dj|−2
, if 1 ≤ i ≤
⌊
k
2
⌋
,
n−1
∑
k
j=k−i+1 |Dj|+2∑
k−i
j=1 |Dj|−1
, if
⌊
k
2
⌋
+ 1 ≤ i ≤ k.
(39)
mizes aggregate payoff.
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PROOF OF COROLLARY 8. For both agents in the independent sets, u ∈ Di with 1 ≤ i ≤
⌊
k
2
⌋
,
and in the dominating subsets, u ∈ Di with
⌊
k
2
⌋
+ 1 ≤ i ≤ k, we can compute the length of the
shortest paths as follows:
d(u, v) =

1 for all v ∈
⋃k
j=k−i+1Dj,
2 for all v ∈
⋃k−i
j=1Dj.
(40)
In order to compute the closeness centrality we have to consider all pairs of agents in the graph
and compute the length of the shortest path between them, which is given in Equation (40). We
obtain for any agent u ∈ Di, i = 1, . . . , k, the following expression
Cc(u) =


n−1
∑
k
j=k−i+1 |Dj|+2∑
k−i
j=1 |Dj|−2
, if 1 ≤ i ≤
⌊
k
2
⌋
n−1
∑
k
j=k−i+1 |Dj|+2∑
k−i
j=1 |Dj|−1
, if
⌊
k
2
⌋
+ 1 ≤ i ≤ k.
(41)
Note that we have subtracted 1 and 2 in the denominator, respectively, since the sums would
otherwise include the contribution of agent u herself.
We have that closeness centrality is identical for all agents in the same set. Also note that
Cc(u) = 1 for u ∈ Dk. Moreover, closeness centrality is increasing with increasing degree.
The closeness centralities of the agents in descending order for the graph in Figure 1, left, are
1, 1, 9/11, 9/13, 9/14, 9/14, 9/15, 9/15, 9/16, 9/16 while in the graph in Figure 1, right, they are
1, 9/10, 9/11, 9/14, 9/14, 9/15, 9/15, 9/15, 9/16, 9/17.
C.2.3. Betweenness Centrality
Betweenness centrality is defined as [Freeman, 1977]
Cb(u) = ∑
u 6=v 6=w∈G
g(v, u,w)
g(v,w)
, (42)
where g(v,w) denotes the number of shortest paths from agent v to agent w and g(v, u,w)
counts the number of paths from agent v to agent w that pass through agent u.
The betweenness centrality for a nested split graph can be derived from its degree partition
as follows.
Corollary 9. Consider a nested split graph G = (N , E) and let D = (D0,D1, . . . ,Dk) be the degree
partition of G. Then cb(u) = 0 if u ∈ Di, i = 0, . . . ,
⌊
k
2
⌋
and for each u ∈ Di, v ∈ Di−1, i =⌊
k
2
⌋
+ 1, . . . , k, the betweenness centrality is given by
Cb(u) =


0 if , i =
⌊
k
2
⌋
+ 1, k odd
|D⌊ k2⌋
|
(
|D⌊ k2⌋
|−1
)
∑
k
j=⌊ k2⌋+1
|Dj|
, if , i =
⌊
k
2
⌋
+ 1, k even
cb(v) +
|Dk−i+1|(|Dk−i+1|−1)
∑
k
j=i |Dj|
+
2|Dk−i+1|∑
i−1
j=k−i+2 |Dj|
∑
k
j=i |Dj|
, if
⌊
k
2
⌋
+ 2 ≤ i ≤ k.
(43)
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PROOF OF COROLLARY 9. In this proof, we follow closely Hagberg et al. [2006]. The agents in
the independent sets Di, 0 ≤ i ≤
⌊
k
2
⌋
do not lie on any shortest path between two other agents
in the network and thus their betweenness centrality vanishes. For the agents in the dominating
subsets we have that the betweenness centrality of the agent u ∈ D⌊ k2⌋+1
vanishes if k is odd and
is given by |D⌊ k2⌋
|
(
|D⌊ k2⌋
| − 1
)
/∑k
j=⌊ k2⌋+1
|Dj| if k is even. The latter result is due the shortest
path between agents that are both in D⌊ k2⌋
. Next, consider an agent u ∈ Di and v ∈ Di−1, with⌊
k
2
⌋
+ 2 ≤ i ≤ k. Then the betweenness centrality of agent u is given by the following recursive
relationship
Cb(v) +
|Dk−i+1| (|Dk−i+1| − 1)
∑
k
j=i |Dj|
+
2|Dk−i+1|∑
i−1
j=k−i+2 |Dj|
∑
k
j=i |Dj|
. (44)
The first term in Equation (44) is due to the fact that all shortest paths through lower dominating
nodes v ∈ Di−1 have the same length as through u ∈ Di. The second term in Equation (44)
represents the contribution of paths between nodes inDk−i+1, divided by the number of shortest
path passing through the agents in the dominating subsets Dj, i ≤ j ≤ k. The third term
in Equation (44) represents all path between an agent in Dk−i+1 and the other being in Dj,
k− i+ 2 ≤ j ≤ i− 1, divided by the number of shortest path passing through the agents in the
dominating subsets Dj, i ≤ j ≤ k.
From Corollary 9, we find that the agents in the independent sets Di with 1 ≤ i ≤
⌊
k
2
⌋
have
vanishing betweenness centrality. From the above equation we also observe that the between-
ness centrality is increasingwith degree such that the agents inDk have the highest betweenness
centrality, the agents in Dk−1 the second highest betweenness centrality and so on. Thus, the
ordering of betweenness centralities follows the degree ordering for all agents in the dominat-
ing subsets while the agents in the independent sets have vanishing betweenness centrality.
For the betweenness centralities of the agents in the graph in Figure 1, left, we obtain in de-
scending order 109/6, 109/6, 31/6, 1/2, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0 while in the graph in Figure 1, right, they
are 28, 12, 6, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0.
C.2.4. Eigenvector Centrality
There is a central property that holds for nested split graphs in relation to Bonacich central-
ity, namely that the agents with higher degree also have higher Bonacich centrality. Similar to
part (i) of Proposition 1 we can give the following corollary.52
Corollary 10. Let v be the eigenvector associatedwith the largest real eigenvalueλPF(G) of the adjacency
matrix A of a nested split graph G = (N , E). For each i ∈ N , let vi be the eigenvector centrality of
agent i. Consider a pair of agents i, j ∈ N . If and only if agent i has a higher degree than agent j then i
has a higher eigenvector centrality than j, i.e. di > dj ⇔ vi > vj.
PROOF OF COROLLARY 10. The proof is identical to the proof of part (i) of Proposition 1.
52A similar result can be found in Grassi et al. [2007].
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C.2.5. Centrality Rankings
Putting together the results for different centrality measures derived in the previous sec-
tions, we can make the following observation of the rankings of agents for different centrality
measures in a nested split graph.
Corollary 11. Consider a nested split graph G = (N , E). Let Cd, Cc, Cb, Cv denote the vectors of
degree, closeness, betweenness and eigenvector centrality in G. Then for any l,m ∈ {d, c, v}, l 6= m and
i, j ∈ N we have that Cl(i) ≥ Cl(j) ⇔ Cm(i) ≥ Cm(j), and Cl(i) ≥ Cl(j) ⇒ Cb(i) ≥ Cb(j).
PROOF OF COROLLARY 11. The proof is a direct application of Corollaries 7, 8 9 and Proposi-
tion 1.
If and only if an agent i has the k-th highest degree centrality then i is the agent with the k-th
highest closeness and eigenvector centrality. This result also holds for Bonacich centrality (see
Proposition 1). Moreover, if an agent i has the k-th highest degree centrality then she also has the
k-th highest betweenness centrality and this also holds for closeness, eigenvector and Bonacich
centrality, respectively. The ordering induced by degree, closeness eigenvector and Bonacich
centrality coincide and these orderings also apply in a weak sense for betweenness centrality.
D. Interpreting the Model for Financial and Trade Networks (Supplementary Mate-
rial)
In this section, we discuss two stylized applications of our payoff function introduced in
Equation (1) that will be useful for our empirical analysis. Section D.1 introduces networks of
banks operating in loan markets, while Section D.2 discusses networks of trade relationships
between countries.
D.1. Networks of Banks
Consider a population of banks N = {1, 2, . . . , n} and a network G ∈ Ω representing links
between them. Links in this context can be defined in a variety of ways. In the banking networks
that we study, the links represent the presence of an interbank loan. In this context we consider
a model of quantity choice based on competition in quantities of lending a` la Cournot between
banks with a single product (a loan). Each bank i ∈ N provides a quantity xi ≥ 0 of loans. As in
Cohen-Cole et al. [2011] we assume the following inverse linear demand function for the price
(interest rate) of the loans of bank i
pi = 1− θxi, (45)
where θ > 0. Equation (45) implies that banks offer different types of loans which cannot be
substituted and therefore operate in independent loan markets.53 The marginal cost of each
bank i is ci(G) ≥ 0. The profit function πi : R
n
+ ×Ω → R of bank i in a network G ∈ Ω is given
by
πi(x,G) = pixi − ci(G)xi = xi − θx
2
i − ci(G)xi.
53This is an extreme assumption where customers are typically not able to substitute one type of loan
for another, and each type of loan constitutes an independent market. Adams et al. [2002] provide a
related empirical study of the market power of banks offering different loan types. See Cohen-Cole et al.
[2011] where banks operate in a single loan market and loans are perfectly substitutable.
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We consider an interrelated cost function defined as follows [cf. Cohen-Cole et al., 2011]
ci(G) = c0 − λ
n
∑
j=1
aijxj, (46)
where c0 > 0 represents a bank’s marginal cost when it has no links, and λ > 0 is the cost
reduction induced by each link formed by a bank. Equation (46) means that the marginal cost
of each bank i is a decreasing function of the quantities produced by all banks j ∈ Ni that have
a direct link with bank i. As stated above, this is because the operational costs of a trading floor
or treasury operation decline per dollar of loan as loan size increases. We further assume that
c0 is large enough such that ci(G) ≥ 0 for all i ∈ N and G ∈ Ω. The profit function for bank i is
then given by
πi(x,G) = xi − θx
2
i − ci(G)xi = axi − θx
2
i + λ
n
∑
j=1
aijxixj, (47)
where we have denoted by a = 1− c0. In the following we normalize θ = 1. We are in the
framework of our model since the utility functions in Equations (1) and (47) are equivalent. It is
then straightforward to show that the equilibrium loan quantities are given by q∗i = abi(G,λ),
where bi(G,λ) is the Bonacich centrality of bank i in the network G, and equilibrium profits are
π∗i = (q
∗
i )
2 = a2bi(G,λ)
2 [Ballester et al., 2006].
D.2. International Trade Networks
Consider a set of countries N = {1, 2, . . . , n} and a network G ∈ Ω representing links
between them. A link in this context indicates the presence of an (import or export) trade rela-
tionship between two countries. Each country i provides a volume xi ≥ 0 of trade. Countries
are local monopolists and the inverse demand function for country i ∈ N is given by Equation
(45) with a parameter θ > 0. This means that we assume that products produced by different
countries are not substitutable. The marginal cost of production of each country i is ci(G) ≥ 0.
The profit function πi : R
n
+ ×Ω → R of country i in a trade network G ∈ Ω is given by Equa-
tion (47) where xi is the quantity produced by country i. We consider the marginal cost function
defined in Equation (46) where c0 > 0 represents a country’s marginal cost when it has no links,
and λ > 0 is the cost reduction induced by each trade relationship formed by a country. Produc-
tion costs decrease with the volume of trade of the trading partner due to technology spillovers
[cf. e.g. Coe and Helpman, 1995; Grossman and Helpman, 1991]. We further assume that c0 is
large enough such that ci(G) ≥ 0 for all i ∈ N and G ∈ Ω. The profit function for country i
is then given by Equation (47) where we denote by a = 1− c0 and normalize θ = 1. It is clear
that, as for the banking network, we are again in the framework of our model. Note also that in
the context of trade, the influence of centrality has been documented in De Benedictis and Tajoli
[2011].
E. Introducing Link Formation Costs (Supplementary Material)
Consider the network formation process of Definition 2 with one modification: The agent
who wants to create a link needs to pay a cost c and creates the link only of it increases her
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payoff. The following proposition gives a bound on the linking cost c such that link monotonicity
holds,54 that is, marginal payoffs from forming a link are always positive.
Proposition 6. Consider the network formation process (G(t))t∈R+ in Definition 2. Assume that there
is a cost c ≥ 0 of creating a link for the agent who initiates that link. Further, assume that agents create
links only if it increases their payoff. Then, if c is smaller than λ(2− λ)/(2(1− λ)2), link monotonicity
holds and the emerging network will always be a nested split graph.
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 6. For notational simplicity we drop the time index and denote by
G ≡ G(t). We consider the network G ⊕ (i, j) obtained by adding the link (i, j) /∈ G. The
marginal payoff from forming a link (i, j) for agent i ∈ N is given by
π∗i (G⊕ (i, j),λ)− π
∗
i (G,λ) =
1
2
(
bi(G⊕ (i, j),λ)
2 − bi(G,λ)
2
)
=
1
2
(bi(G⊕ (i, j),λ) − bi(G,λ)) (bi(G⊕ (i, j),λ) + bi(G,λ)) .
Note that the Bonacich centrality of agent i ∈ N can be written as bi(G,λ) = 1+ ∑j∈Ni bj(G,λ).
The change in the Bonacich centrality from forming the link (i, j) is given by
bi(G⊕ (i, j),λ)− bi(G,λ) = ∑
k∈Ni\{j}
(bk(G⊕ (i, j),λ)− bk(G,λ)))︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
+λbj(G⊕ (i, j),λ)
≥ λbj(G⊕ (i, j),λ) ≥ λmin
k∈N
bk(G⊕ (i, j),λ).
In the first line from above we have used the fact that the number of walks emanating at i is
increasing with the addition of a link and so is the Bonacich centrality.
The smallest Bonacich centrality in a non-empty graph G (after the creation of a link the
graph is always non-empty) is obtained in a path of length 2 (dyad), P2, for which bi(P2,λ) =
1
1−λ . Hence, we have that bi(G⊕ (i, j),λ)− bi(G,λ) > λ/(1−λ) and bi(G⊕ (i, j),λ)+ bi(G,λ) >
(2− λ)/(1− λ), so that the marginal payoff of agent i from forming a link (i, j) is bounded from
below by π∗i (G⊕ (i, j),λ) − π
∗
i (G,λ) >
λ(2−λ)
2(1−λ)2
. This bound might seem crude but note that if
the linking cost is higher than λ(2− λ)/(2(1− λ)2), the empty graph is a stable network, irre-
spective of how we allow agents to remove links. Hence, we find that if the cost c of a link is
lower than λ(2− λ)/(2(1− λ)2), a link will always be formed and the networks generated in
our network formation process will all be nested split graphs.
The above proposition shows that nested split graphs can also arise even when links are costly
to be formed, as long as the costs are not too large.
54Link monotonicity requires that π∗i (G⊕ (i, j), λ) > π
∗
i (G, λ) for all agents i, j ∈ N and links (i, j) /∈ G
[cf. e.g. Dutta et al., 2005].
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